A New Argument for the Rationality of Perception
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A New Argument for the Rationality of Perception Neil Mehta 1 Received: 18 March 2020 / Accepted: 15 September 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper, I offer a new argument for the perceptual rationality thesis: the claim that perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel has offered several intertwined arguments for this same thesis, and, as you will see, one of Siegel’s arguments is what inspires my own. However, I will suggest that the new argument is significantly better-supported than Siegel’s original argument. Everyone agrees that beliefs based on perceptual experiences can be rational or irrational. But in this paper, I offer a new argument for what I will call the perceptual rationality thesis: the claim that perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel has offered several intertwined arguments for this same thesis, and, as you will see, one of Siegel’s arguments is what inspires my own. This argument of Siegel relies on the premise that perceptual experiences can be the outputs of inferences (§1).1 However, I will show that Siegel provides little support for this premise (§2). By contrast, my new argument relies on the premise that perceptual experiences can contain categorizations, and I will suggest that the empirical support for this premise is substantial (§3–§8). That said, in the spirit of honest inquiry, I cannot commit fully to the perceptual rationality thesis. For many, they think that there is some special feature of perceptual experiences—perhaps that they are formed subpersonally, or that they are not adjustable via deliberation—that blocks them from being rationally appraisable.2 If this line of resistance is warranted—and, truly, I just do not know whether it is—then even the new argument fails (as does Siegel’s original argument) (§9).
1
Ibid, p. 17.
2
For these objections, see the excellent contributions of Ori Beck and Alison Springle, respectively, to Siegel et al. (2018).
* Neil Mehta [email protected]
1
Yale-NUS College, Singapore, Singapore
N. Mehta
Nevertheless, before I arrive at my final assessment of the perceptual rationality thesis, I find it worthwhile to construct the best argument for it that I can. I also find it worthwhile to see precisely which premises of this argument are strongest and which require further scrutiny. I hope that you will share these sentiments.
1 Siegel’s Argument Introduced A central conclusion of Siegel’s book, and the focus of this paper, is the following claim:
The perceptual rationality thesis (first pass): Perceptual experiences can be rational or irrational. (Siegel 2017, p. 15).3 But what modality is expressed by the word “can” here? My interpretation is that Siegel is saying that at least some actual perceptual experiences are rational or irrational. My first reason for giving this interpretation has to do with Siegel’s discussion of something that she c
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