A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to be a Realist Without Really Knowing It
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A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to be a Realist Without Really Knowing It Samuel Kahn 1 Received: 16 November 2018 / Accepted: 10 February 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism (SR). In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument (NMA). Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I rehearse the main moves in the recent debate about SR. In the second, I argue that the discussion in section one enables us to see that most of the arguments in the recent debate about SR mistake their target: instead of being about SR, they are about meta-SR. I argue that what I call the JJ-principle should be rejected and, further, that if the JJ-principle is rejected, then meta-SR may be cleaved from SR. This enables me to advance to a position I call thin realism in the third and final section of the paper. Keywords Scientific realism . KK principle . Justification
1 Summarizing the Recent Debate In this section I provide a brief overview of the main argumentative moves in the recent debate about SR, beginning with a brief description of what SR is.1 SR is conventionally defined in terms of unobservables. According realists, we are justified in believing what our best scientific theories tell us about unobservables. According to antirealists, we are not.
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My overview is in the line of what followers of Lakatos might call a rational reconstruction.
* Samuel Kahn [email protected]
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Department of Philosophy, IUPUI, 425 University Blvd, Cavanaugh 331, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA
Philosophia
Now this definition seems to imply that according to realists we may assert that these theories get everything right about the underlying nature of reality. This is sometimes referred to as naive realism. It is a useful starting point, but it is not widely held. I shall introduce more selective forms of SR momentarily. This definition also presupposes that there is a meaningful distinction to be made between observables and unobservables. How (and whether) that is so is a matter of debate.2 However, such debates are not germane for my purposes. It will suffice to note that there is a prima facie plausible difference between observing my hand (observable) in front of my face and “observing” a positron (unobservable) in a cloud chamber; between observing a fire (observable) by sticking my hand in it and “observing” the early stages of the universe (unobservable) by measuring the cosmic microwave background. The point of this is that the debate about SR is supposed to be distinct (and downstream) from debates about radical skepticism (RS) and brain-in-a-vat-like skeptical hypotheses. Tha
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