A theoretical framework for goal-based choice and for prescriptive analysis

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A theoretical framework for goal-based choice and for prescriptive analysis Kurt A. Carlson & Chris Janiszewski & Ralph L. Keeney & David H. Krantz & Howard C. Kunreuther & Mary Frances Luce & J. Edward Russo & Stijn M. J. van Osselaer & Detlof von Winterfeldt

Published online: 31 July 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract This paper extends the familiar multi-stage framework for choice by explicitly describing the role that goals play at each stage. We first present a typology of goals, ranging from content to process and from immediate to long-term illustrating it in the context of two examples—purchasing a new car and earthquake retrofitting. We then delineate each stage of the choice process based on recent advances from the descriptive literature on the influence of the various goals. Finally, we draw the prescriptive implications as to how goals can inform what we know, or need to know, about the choice process. Keywords Goals . Choice process . Prescription K. A. Carlson : R. L. Keeney : M. F. Luce The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA C. Janiszewski Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA D. H. Krantz Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA H. C. Kunreuther The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, 500 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA J. E. Russo (*) JGSM, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-6201, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. M. J. van Osselaer RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands D. von Winterfeldt Lewis Hall, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

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Market Lett (2008) 19:241–254

The primary goal of any theory of human behavior should be to produce testable predictions that have meaningful implications for the behaviors of interest. For example, in the context of consumer decision making, a good theory should predict consumers’ preferences accurately. Contrary to this, most existing theories of consumer choice treat preferences as primitive and focus on predicting which choices will best reflect these preferences. By assuming that preferences are known and stable, such models can make strong predictions about consumer decisions without actually observing consumer behavior (Simon 1959). This emphasis on rationality is a natural consequence of normative theories that proffer how consumers ought to behave, as opposed to descriptive ones that emphasizes how consumers do behave. In this paper, we pursue a descriptive theory of decision making, where preferences emerge from the pursuit of multiple goals, rather than being assumed as primitives. We view consumer preferences and consumer decisions as the output of goal pursuit. This departure from rational economic models allows us to characterize consumer behavior more fully. For example, instead of assuming that consumer choices are the simple output of application of one’s utility function to a set of known alternatives, with known consequences, we assume th