Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force
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Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force Jörg Löschke 1 Received: 16 May 2019 / Revised: 15 April 2020 / Accepted: 7 May 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents. Keywords Agent-relative reasons . Agent-neutral reasons . Value theory . Restrictions .
Relationships . Projects The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is widely recognized as philosophically important. Some authors even call it one of the most important findings in twentieth century ethical theory (Hurka 2003; Hammerton 2016). Among other things, it serves as a criterion to assess the plausibility of a moral theory: it is a common claim that consequentialism in its classical formulation cannot accommodate agent-relative reasons (McNaughton and Rawling 1991, 1993, 1995; Pettit 2000; Wallace 2009; Ridge 2017), and consequentialists themselves take this as an objection against their view, as evidenced by the fact that there have been numerous attempts to reconcile agent-relative reasons with a consequentialist framework. Very broadly speaking, the distinction matters because it expresses the idea that agents have a personal point of view from which some things matter to them more than others, and that moral theory should be able to accommodate our capability of taking a personal perspective on the world.
* Jörg Löschke [email protected]–muenchen.de
1
UZH Philosophisches Seminar, Zollikerstrasse 117, CH-8008 Zürich, Switzerland
Philosophia
However, despite its importance, there is no clear consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. This comes to no surprise: the distinction is no part of our everyday language, and we cannot analyze the way regular people use the notions “agent-relative reasons” and “agent-neutral reasons” to determine how to understand the distinction correctly. It might even appear pointless to argue about how to understand the distinction. “Agent-relative reasons” and “agent-neutral reasons” are philosophical terms of art, and one might think that one can use them however one likes, as long as they are used consistently. However, I think that this is a mistake. It is philosophically important and illuminating to reflect on the distinction and its best understanding. After all, the distinction has not been introduced for the sake of inventing philosophical terms of art, but to capture certain
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