Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics
The purpose of this work is to develop a general theory of ethics which ex plains the logical status of moral judgments and the nature of the general principles which we should adopt and on the basis of which we should act. The enquiry into the logical f
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META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS by
H. J. McCLOSKEY
~ .. MARTlNUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1969
o /969 by Marlinus NghoJ!, The Hague, N~therla"ds Softcover reprint oltlle hardcover 1st edition 1969
All rights ftJer.ed, including the right to trans/ate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof ill any form
ISBN 978·94-011·9299-6 (eBook) ISBN 978·94-011·8544·8 DQI10.1007/978·94-011·929%
PREFACE
The purpose of this work is to develop a general theory of ethics which explains the logical status of moral judgments and the nature of the general principles which we should adopt and on the basis of which we should act. The enquiry into the logical function of moral judgments is entered into as important in its own right and as a preliminary to the normative enquiry, for it is on the basis of our conclusions in the area of meta-ethics, that we determine the appropriate method of reaching our normative ethic. The approach followed in the meta-ethical enquiry is that of examining theories of the past and present with a view to seeing why and in what respects they fail, in particular, what features of moral discourse are not adequately explained or accommodated by them. A positive theory which seeks to take full account of these and all other logical features of moral discourse is then developed in terms of a modified intuitionism of the kind outlined by W. D. Ross, 'good' being explained as the name of a consequential property, 'right' in terms of moral suitability, and moral obligations as consisting in our being constrained to act in certain ways by facts we apprehend to constitute moral reasons which constrain us so to act. In the normative enquiry, utilitarian, Kantian, and Thomist natural law theories are examined and rejected as unsatisfactory, and in their place a theory of a plurality of intrinsic goods, and of principles of prima facie obligation (following Ross in some respects but diverging from him in the account given of the content of the principles of prima facie obligation) is advanced. It is not possible in a work of this kind to examine every important theory which has ever been developed in the areas discussed. As many important theories as possible are examined, but the selection of theories for discussion has been guided by consideration of how an examination of their shortcomings will advance the argument of this work, as well as by consideration of their importance in the history of ethics or in the contemporary ethical scene. However, the reader will readily see how the sorts of arguments de-
VI
PREFACE
veloped here admit of restatement or further development against different formulations of these theories and against theories of different types. As I have written on themes discussed here in a number of papers, I have referred the reader ~ the relevant article where a fuller treatment of the issues raised is to be found in the article. Some use has also been made of material from a number of these articles, and I thank the editors of the following journals for permission to do so: Australa
