An Axiological-Trajectory Theodicy
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An Axiological-Trajectory Theodicy Thomas Metcalf 1 # Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract I develop a new theodicy in defense of Anselmian theism, one that has several advantages over traditional and recent replies to the Problem of Evil. To make my case, I first explain the value of a positive trajectory: a forward-in-time decrease in ‘first-order-gratuitous’ evil: evil that is not necessary for any equalor-greater first-order good, but may be necessary for a higher-order good, such as the good of strongly positive axiological trajectory. Positive trajectory arguably contributes goodness to a world in proportion to the magnitude of this trajectory, and worlds that contain first-order-gratuitous evil thereby have the potential to contain a strongly positive trajectory. This would arguably explain why God would permit first-order-gratuitous evils: he may be indifferent between a world with no first-order-gratuitous evil (and thus a flat trajectory) and a world with some first-order-gratuitous evil but a strongly positive trajectory. Next, I answer the most salient objections to this theodicy. Finally, I explain how this theodicy is superior to some common theodicies. Keywords Theodicy . Problem of evil . Gratuitous evil . Axiology . Anselmian theism
* Thomas Metcalf [email protected]
1
Philosophy, Spring Hill College, 4000 Dauphin St, Mobile, AL 36608, USA
T. Metcalf
Introduction The standard Problem of Evil is intended to provide evidence against Anselmian theism, according to which God is the maximally great, omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect creator of the universe.1 The currently most-prominent version of the Problem of Evil (Rowe 1979) argues that God would not permit gratuitous evil: evil that he could have prevented without thereby sacrificing an equal or greater good. Yet arguably, gratuitous evil exists. No single reply to the Problem has emerged as a consensus solution.2 Therefore, defenders of Anselmian theism have reason to look for a new approach. One may roughly summarize the four extant types of reply to the Problem of Evil as follows, although there is some overlap between these tactics. First, theodicists defend explanations for why a morally perfect God might nevertheless allow the evils we observe. This would normally occur because the evil necessary for some equal-orgreater first-order good,3 such as significant free-will (Plantinga 1977: 33–34), soulmaking (Hick 1977: 375), regular laws of nature (Reichenbach 1976; van Inwagen 2006: 114 ff.), or incarnation and atonement (Plantinga 2004), but God could also be morally obligated to permit some evil that was not, in itself, necessary for some equal or greater good (cf. Leftow 2013).4 Second, skeptical theists (Wykstra 1984) argue that for all we know, God has a morally sufficient reason to allow the evils in the world. Third, radicals argue that gratuitous evil is compatible with God’s existence after all, or that a morally perfect God might not necessarily eliminate gratuitous evils (Kraay 2010; van Inwagen 1988: 167 ff.; Murphy 2017).
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