Annalisa Coliva on Wittgenstein and Epistemic Relativism
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Annalisa Coliva on Wittgenstein and Epistemic Relativism Martin Kusch
Received: 6 April 2012 / Accepted: 20 July 2012 / Published online: 19 October 2012 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
Introduction Annalisa Coliva's Moore and Wittgenstein (2010a) offers a thorough, nuanced, sophisticated and original reading of the two philosophers' reflections on certainties and scepticism. In this paper I shall focus on the one line of argument in the book with which I disagree: the discussion of epistemic relativism. I shall focus my critique not only on the relevant section of the monograph (2010a: 188–203), but also on Coliva's paper "Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?" (2010b). The paper is wider is scope than the section in that it draws together, and condenses, relevant and related considerations from all parts of the book.
Interpreters Coliva starts with the remark that "[r]elativists and anti-relativists alike are nowadays mostly united in considering Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist" (2010a: 188; 2010b: 1). To prove her point she mentions eight texts between 1977 and 2006. To her line-up one could add Bloor (1996); Gier (1981); Gullvåg (1988); Grayling (2001); Haller (1995); Rhees (2003), and Vasiliou (2004), as well as authors who attribute to Wittgenstein closely related forms of conceptual relativism: Glock (1996, 2008) and Hacker (1996). More importantly, I am puzzled by the absence from Coliva's list of the equally numerous earlier contributions that, like her own, reject the case for calling Wittgenstein an epistemological relativist: Anscombe (1976); Bambrough (1991); Blackburn (2004); Crary (2007); Dilman (2004); Hertzberg (1976); Lear (1984); Morawetz (1978); O’Grady (2004); Putnam (1992); Rhees (2003); Schulte (1988); Sluga (1996); B. Williams (1971/1981, 1974-1975/1981); M. Williams (2007), and von Wright (1982). Some of Coliva's arguments overlap
M. Kusch (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universitaetsstrasse 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected]
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with lines of thought in this earlier literature. Considering it in detail, and building upon it, could have strengthened her case and given a more balanced picture of where the debate on the question of Wittgenstein's relativism has got to.
Definitions Coliva characterises epistemic relativism as follows. First, "there could be … different epistemic systems, none of which would be intrinsically correct". Second, each such system "would be, from a metaphysical point of view, as good as any other, and would certify (as true and) justified different propositions". Third, the choice between epistemic systems "couldn't be based on rational considerations", and thus "the passage from one epistemic system to another would always be a form of conversion or persuasion" (2010a: 188; 2010b: 1). I do not disagree with this suggestion. But I propose going further and identifying various ‘conditions of relativism’, subsets or clusters of which are often regarded—by friends and
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