Antineutrino Detectors Remain Impractical for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
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Pure and Applied Geophysics
Antineutrino Detectors Remain Impractical for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring MICHAEL FOXE,1 THEODORE BOWYER,1 RACHEL CARR,2 JOHN ORRELL,1 and BRENT VANDEVENDER1 Abstract—Fission explosions produce large numbers of antineutrinos. It is occasionally asked whether this distinctive, unshieldable emission could help reveal clandestine nuclear weapon explosions. The practical challenge encountered is that detectors large enough for this application are cost prohibitive, likely on the multi-billion-dollar scale. In this paper, we review several hypothetical use cases for antineutrino detectors as supplements to the seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and airborne radionuclide sensors of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s International Monitoring System. In each case, if an anti-neutrino detector could be constructed that would compete with existing capabilities, we conclude that the cost would considerably outstrip the value it might add to the existing monitoring network, compared to the significantly lower costs for the same or superior capability. Keywords: Antineutrino, nuclear explosion monitoring, radioxenon, CTBTO PrepCom.
1. Introduction The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a network of detectors (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide (particulate and noble gas) throughout the world for the purpose of verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Within the CTBT framework, all nuclear explosion testing is banned, regardless of the location or size of the nuclear explosive test. Waveform technologies (seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound) observe a signal that transports at the speed of sound. Airborne radionuclide signals can be observed on a much longer time scale. Observable airborne radionuclide signals may be delayed both due to the
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Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99352, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
subsurface gas migration and atmospheric transport but can be a clear sign of a nuclear explosion (with the ability to confirm the nuclear nature of an explosion). These measurement techniques currently form the technical basis for world-wide monitoring under the CTBT’s verification regime. The combination of these detector technologies offers potential to both estimate the magnitude of events, with a goal of verifying whether a suspicious event is nuclear in nature. Yet, even with the complementary abilities of these technologies, there are scenarios where the detection mechanisms may not yet achieve the desired level of sensitivity achieved by the current IMS. In such situations, it might be advantageous to have a complementary detection technology capable of filling in the measurement gaps or otherwise augment existing IMS detection capabilities. This complementary technology could provide a redundant detection capability for an improved confidence of detection. That motivates the search for new and compelling methods for d
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