Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent?
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Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra1
The Author(s) 2019
Abstract Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Gideon Rosen, in his article ‘‘The Limits of Contingency’’ (2006), has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many laws of ontology are metaphysically contingent (Rosen 2006: 20, 27). Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true. Keywords Necessity Contingency Laws of ontology Natures
1 Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Rosen (2006) has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra [email protected] 1
Oriel College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4EW, UK
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G. Rodriguez-Pereyra
laws of ontology are metaphysically contingent (Rosen 2006: 20, 27).1 Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true. In Sect. 2 I shall explain what I mean by the categorical laws of ontology, and I shall explain the Non-Standard conception of metaphysical necessity and the Kantian character of natures. In Sect. 3 I shall argue for the incompatibility of the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian, and in Sect. 4 I shall argue that if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
2 By the laws of ontology, or ontological laws, I will understand sy
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