The Generalizations of Biology: Historical and Contingent?
Several influential philosophers of biology have raised the claim that the generalizations of biology are historical and contingent (Beatty J (1995) The evolutionary contingency thesis. In: E. Sober (Ed.) (2006) Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology (
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The Generalizations of Biology: Historical and Contingent? Alexander Reutlinger
Abstract Several influential philosophers of biology have raised the claim that the generalizations of biology are historical and contingent (Beatty J (1995) The evolutionary contingency thesis. In: E. Sober (Ed.) (2006) Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology (pp. 217–247). Cambridge: MIT Press; Schaffner, K. (1993). Discovery and explanation in biology and medicine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Rosenberg (British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 52(4): 735–760, 2001); Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Clarendon; Mitchell, S. D. (2009). Unsimple truths: Science, complexity and policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). This claim divides into the following subclaims, each of which I will contest: firstly, biological generalizations are restricted to a particular space-time region. I argue that biological generalizations are universal with respect to space and time. Secondly, biological generalizations are restricted to specific kinds of entities, i.e., these generalizations do not quantify over an unrestricted domain. I will challenge this second claim by providing an interpretation of biological generalizations that do quantify over an unrestricted domain of objects. Thirdly, biological generalizations are contingent in the sense that their truth depends on special (physically contingent) initial and background conditions. I will argue that the contingent character of biological generalizations does neither diminish their explanatory power nor is it the case that this sort of contingency is exclusively characteristic of biological generalizations. Keywords Evolutionary contingency thesis • Laws of nature • Biological generalizations • Universality • Ceteris paribus laws
A. Reutlinger () Philosophisches Seminar, DFG Research Group “Causation and Explanation”, Universität zu Köln, Richard-Strauss-Str. 2, 50931 Köln, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M.I. Kaiser et al. (eds.), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History, Synthese Library 367, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-7563-3__6, © Springer ScienceCBusiness Media Dordrecht 2014
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A. Reutlinger
6.1 Introduction: The Universality of Laws Many philosophers of biology are convinced that there are important differences between (fundamental) physics and the biological sciences. One salient way in which biology is, according to these philosophers, unlike physics concerns the features of generalizations that play an epistemic role in the scientific practice of these disciplines. It is a majority view in philosophy of biology that (fundamental) physics states universal and exceptionless laws, while the biological sciences rely on nonuniversal and physically contingent generalizations (cf. Beatty 1995; Schaffner 1993; Rosenberg 2001; Mitchell 2002, 2009; Craver 2007).1 This majority view in the philosophy of biology converges with the results of the debate on cete
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