Are We climbing the same mountain?
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Are We climbing the same mountain? Moral theories, moral concepts, moral questions Roger Crisp
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract The paper begins by noting the widespread disagreement that has existed in philosophy from its very inception until now. It is claimed that Henry Sidgwick was right to see the main debate in ethics as between egoists, consequentialists, and deontologists. This raises the question whether the best approach might be to seek a position based on the different theories rather than one alone. Some clarification is then offered of the main questions asked in ethics, and it is claimed that the primary ethical question is that of Socrates: how should one live? Substantive agreement between our three normative theories is possible, but unlikely; and explanatory agreement is conceptually impossible. More restricted agreement may be possible, though doubts can be raised about Derek Parfit’s ‘triple theory’. One might attempt to combine different elements of the theories, syncretically, but again agreement is unlikely. The paper ends by considering the epistemic implications of disagreement, and with a recommendation of a more eirenic methodology for moral philosophy. Keywords Theories, ethical · Disagreement, moral · Parfit, Derek · Sidgwick, Henry
1 Competition or Co-operation? There is something that might loosely be called a paradox at the heart of philosophy. Philosophy is the love – the philia – of wisdom – sophia. Having wisdom is having knowledge, and knowledge, if of propositions, must be true. And the truth is something on which rational beings might be expected to converge. But since its inR. Crisp () St Anne’s College and Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 56 Woodstock Rd, Oxford, OX2 6HS, UK E-Mail: [email protected]
R. Crisp
ception, philosophy has been characterized by, one might even say (again in a loose sense) defined by, disagreement. Socrates’ method of elenchus proceeds largely by attempts at refutation of, for example, the views that what we should aim for in life are money and power (Thrasymachus and Meno), or pleasure (Callicles). In the Meno (80a-d), Socrates defends himself against the charge that he is like a stingray, which numbs those with whom it comes into contact, by arguing that it is better to be in a state of being undecided (aporia) than in a state of false belief, since this gives one greater chance of apprehending the truth, and – if others join you – of agreement. Sadly, of course, Socrates’ dream has become ever more distant, as more and more theories and views have developed in philosophy. But I shall end my paper with the suggestion that there is nevertheless something in the idea that aporia may have advantages over false belief, or even true belief if that belief is itself unjustified. The situation in moral philosophy is as bleak as it has ever been. I shall return in my conclusion to Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, first published in 1874 and revised several times until reaching the canonical and posthumous
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