Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea

When we are looking at proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons – positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activ

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Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea

Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea

Jungmin Kang Editor

Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea

Editor Jungmin Kang Lee Byong Whi Nuclear Energy Policy Center Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Daejeon, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

ISBN 978-94-007-6018-9 ISBN 978-94-007-6019-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London Library of Congress Control Number: 2013932647 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Foreword

During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fighting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was indefinitely extended and continues to be the global framework against the spread of nuclear proliferation. There are now 115 Additional Protocols in force, which enhance IAEA’s verification capabilities. On the downside, the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its subsequent nuclear tests charted a dangerous and negative course. As an additional advers