Asymmetric Benefit Compensation Model for Resolving Transboundary Water Management Conflicts
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Asymmetric Benefit Compensation Model for Resolving Transboundary Water Management Conflicts Jianan Qin 1,2 & Xiang Fu 1,2 & Shaoming Peng 3 Received: 7 March 2020 / Accepted: 22 July 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract
This paper proposes an asymmetric benefit compensation model for stimulating rational agents, who often have disparate geography, hydrology, climate, and socio-economies, to participate in cooperative transboundary water management. A social planner model is initially developed to maximize the total water benefit of a river system under the assumption of perfect cooperation among the agents. Subsequently, a Stackelberg game-theoretical model is used to derive the agents’ disagreement utility based on considering their spatial heterogeneity in water accessibility. Based on the agents’ bargaining weights produced by several multi-attribute decision analysis methods, the aggregate water benefit is then redistributed among the agents by adopting the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The possible benefit compensation solutions are finally compared by using a composite index that can synthetically consider optimality, equity and stability criteria. The Qujiang River Basin in China is used to demonstrate the applicability of the suggested model. The results show that this integrated model can offer useful insights for conflict resolution in river sharing problems. Keywords Transboundary water management . Asymmetric benefit compensationmodel . Multiattribute decision analysis . Optimality, equity and stability . Qujiang River basin
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-02002639-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
* Xiang Fu [email protected]
1
State Key Laboratory of Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Science, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2
Hubei Provincial Key Lab of Water System Science for Sponge City Construction, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
3
Yellow River Engineering Consulting Co. Ltd., Zhengzhou 450003, China
Qin J. et al.
1 Introduction Due to growing demand caused by expanding populations, changing climate patterns and wasteful consumer behavior (Kicsiny et al. 2014), freshwater scarcity is increasingly perceived as a global systemic risk (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016). It is anticipated that approximately 59% of the world population will face a blue water shortage and 36% will face green and blue water shortages by 2050 (Rockström et al. 2009). The lack of access to water resources may fuel conflict and even threaten peace and stability (Eliasson 2015). Efficiently managing such a scarce and precious resource is recognized as the main instrument to alleviate water conflicts (Giordano et al. 2013) and loosen constraints on the sustainable development of human society. However, attaining this goal depends on fair and reasonable water allocation practices (Arjoon et al. 2016) with the aim of maximizing economic benefits and social equality without damagi
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