Conclusion: The Rise of the Riddle of Bacon

It should be clear by now why the riddle of Bacon arose. Generations of researchers admired him for his theory, and this theory did not allow them to criticize this theory respectfully. So the individual Bacon was criticized to save his theory. Stubbe cri

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Conclusion: The Rise of the Riddle of Bacon

It should be clear by now why the riddle of Bacon arose. Generations of researchers admired him for his theory, and this theory did not allow them to criticize this theory respectfully. So the individual Bacon was criticized to save his theory. Stubbe criticized his plagiarism and fake experiments. This criticism was ignored until Liebig repeated it with some bitterness.1 Here is Liebig’s conclusion to his comment on Bacon’s natural history (Liebig 1863, 244): With Bacon, all is external: nowhere in his work do you find a trace of the inner joy or love which animated a Kepler, a Galileo, or a Newton, in their examinations or discoveries or the humility which the accomplishment of a great work called forth, or beholding how much more and how much greater things were still to be done. These men, whether persecuted, disregarded, or oppressed, never deprecated or detracted from what others have done; and not one by them ever thought of claiming the reward or the approbation of the crowd for work which in themselves afford so profound a satisfaction. Compared to those men, Bacon shows like a quack-doctor, who, standing before his booth, tries to make his rivals appear as ignorant as possible, who vaunts his wondrous cures and praises the remedies with which he promises to raise the dead and banish illness from the world; and, finally hints that such services to humanity are not unworthy of recompense. ‘Our Sylva Sylvarum’ says Bacon ‘is, to speak properly, not natural history, but a high kind of natural magic’.

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Thomas Fowler criticizes Liebig’s style (Fowler 1878, 133 note) rather than his views: “it almost seems, as if Bacon had been a personal enemy of” Liebig. Indeed, when he could criticize a contention of Liebig’s he did so, and with no less hostility, although it was on a minor point: Liebig conjectured that Bacon was not in full command over the Latin language and so he surmised that the originals of Bacon’s Latin texts were written in English; and Fowler refuted this conjecture. Even on style Fowler had a point: his expressions of hostility greatly differed in style from that of Liebig. The difference is between the reserve of the English style and the expression of frankness more appreciated on the Continent. Fowler claimed that Liebig’s arguments exhibit preconceived opinions (157). Not so: its nastiness reveals the source of the notorious and tremendous hostility that German professors show towards any criticism whatsoever. This is a mix of psychological sensitivity (that was already manifest in Newton’s conduct), the authoritarian status of most oldstyle German professors, and Bacon’s doctrine of prejudice. For Liebig’s excellent character see Holmyard (1928, 103).

J. Agassi, The Very Idea of Modern Science: Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 298, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5351-8_9, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

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9 Conclusion: The Rise of the Riddle of Bacon

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