Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle
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Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle Freedom C. Onuoha1 · Chikodiri Nwangwu1 · Michael I. Ugwueze1
© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Abstract A number of studies have reviewed the military operational tactics vis-à-vis the claims of Boko Haram defeat. However, there is empirical evidence of soldiers’ mutiny, desertion from war fronts and low morale resulting in high success rate of Boko Haram insurgency. Despite the rise in security sector budget from about US$1.44 billion in 2009 to US2.81 billion in 2018, military-led counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria faces some notable challenges. This article, therefore, provides evidence of how military campaigns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels have been undermined by multiple factors, including corruption. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study contends that a thorough overhaul of the military counterinsurgency operations at all levels is necessary for a more effective and accountable force capable of defeating Boko Haram insurgency. Keywords Boko Haram insurgency · Military operations · Counterinsurgency · Military campaign · Corruption · Nigeria
Introduction Ten years after its escalation, Boko Haram insurgency remains the greatest security challenge destabilising the Lake Chad region, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although the group evolved from Nigeria’s North-East under different names, its violent campaigns transformed into an insurgency with terrorist tactics in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt in northern Nigeria (Onuoha 2010; Burchard and Burgess 2019). The short-lived uprising was quelled by the joint operations of the police and military, leaving more than 800 dead, most of whom were sect members. The group’s charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was also captured * Michael I. Ugwueze [email protected] 1
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Vol.:(0123456789)
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and later killed extra-judicially in police custody (Reliefweb 2012). Following the outcome of the military operation, the then Governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda, enthused over the capture thus: Today we are celebrating that we have been able to see the end of the problem, now I have been vindicated because I have always said that what is happening in Bauchi is not religious but militancy…. We pre-empted them [Boko Haram sect] right and we struck at the right time; that was why we were able to get them (cited in Lawal 2009, p. 39). Violent exploits by the Boko Haram in the last decade, however, have proven that such a celebration of victory was rather premature. The group transformed into a regional security threat in 2014, following the intensification of cross-border attacks in the Lake Chad area. Sustained violence by the group has resulted in massive forced displacement and a widespread humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. Since 2009, the insurgency has killed over 100,000 persons, displaced over 2
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