Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate
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Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate J. Tochukwu Omenma1,2 · Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada2 · Z. Onyinyechi Omenma3
© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Abstract Is Boko Haram consistently motivated by the need for a territorial caliphate? That is, the creation of the Community of Ummah rather than religion as their envisioned motivation. We seek to take this question seriously due to a series of studies that have started drawing conclusions on the territorial goal of most terrorist organisations. One of such body of literature focuses on the relationship between terrorist groups’ proclivity for territory and ungoverned space, or the axiom that politics includes legitimate dominion over a spatial extension. Drawing extensively from the territorial assumptions as well as critical discourse analyses of speeches, we argue that the Community of Ummah in West Africa partly informs Boko Haram’s objective. This assertion found its clearest expression in the administration of Kannama village, the declaring of Gwoza as the Caliphate Headquarters and the use of Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad areas for sanctuaries, planning and executions of attacks and threats. Understanding Boko Haram’s geographical motivation has its merit of adopting a more offensive and proactive counterterrorism that aims at destroying terrorist resources, eliminating safe havens and undertaking actions that improve the retention of liberated spaces. Keywords Community of Ummah · Territorial terrorism · Offensive operations · Boko Haram
* Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada [email protected] 1
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa
2
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
3
Department of Social Science Education, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
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J. Tochukwu Omenma et al.
Introduction For the past decade, Boko Haram terror groups have caused over 20 3751 deaths, about 30,000 wounded, not less than 2–3 million persons displaced,2 and 10 000 cholera cases along with 175 deaths recorded3 in 2018. An estimated $9 billion4 economic cost of damages linked to the Islamic groups were recorded as at 2016, while the 2018 Global Terrorism Index indicates that Boko Haram falls among the four deadliest terror groups in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, (IEP) 2018). Boko Haram’s potency and resilience contradict government claims of a “technically defeated” terrorist organisation, rather Boko Haram and its splinter groups are expanding their operational base and linking up with criminal groups and jihadists from the Maghreb and other West African countries.5 The groups have also benefited from the conflict environment in Libya and the collapse of the Islamic State caliphate in the Middle East (al-Khoei et al. 2017). Since post 9/11 and the Islamic States of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) controlled territories in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram’s strategy has been to hold down on specific locations. A
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