Degrees of Doxastic Justification
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification Moritz Schulz1 Received: 23 September 2019 / Accepted: 14 October 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mechanisms involved. It is shown that the structure of degrees of justification converges to ranking theory under ideal conditions.
1 Doxastic Justification Justification comes in two flavors: propositional justification and doxastic justification (Audi 1983; Feldman and Conee 1985). To illustrate the difference, consider this case: Jane and her guru Jane believes that she is capable of passing the bar exam. Her track record so far is impressive and she has studied hard. Curiously, however, her belief is due to another source of information: her guru told her that she will pass. Needless to say, this guru is notoriously unreliable in his predictions.
There is a sense in which Jane’s belief is justified. The evidence she possesses, what she knows about her track record and the amount of studying she has done, sufficiently supports the proposition she believes. But there is also a sense in which Jane’s belief is not justified, for her belief is not adequately based on the evidence: she believes what she believes for the wrong reasons. These two senses are standardly marked by saying that Jane’s belief is propositionally justified but lacks doxastic justification. Just like propositional justification, doxastic justification can be more or less strong. For instance, in one variation of the case above, Jane may believe that she is capable of passing the exam because her track record is impressive and she has studied hard. Compare this with a case in which Jane’s supervisor additionally told her that she is confident that Jane will pass, and Jane is sensitive to this additional reason. It seems
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Moritz Schulz [email protected] TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany
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M. Schulz
that in the second case, Jane’s doxastic justification is stronger, or, to put it differently, her degree of doxastic justification is higher.1 As a first pass, the more (independent) reasons adequately ground one’s belief, and the stronger these reasons are, the higher one’s degree of doxastic justification. What constitutes a certain degree of doxastic justification? What principles could one expect degrees of doxastic justification to obey? And what distinguishes degrees of imperfect thinkers from degrees of perfect beings? Somewhat surprisingly, degrees of doxastic justification are largely underresearched. There is considerable work on the nature of doxastic justification. And there is, of course, a longstanding debate on degrees of propositional justificatio
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