Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules
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Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules Matthew Hammerton1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
1 Introduction A deontic constraint prohibits performing an act of a certain type even when performing it is the only way to prevent others performing more acts of that type. Commonsense morality tells us that there are deontic constraints. For example, suppose that the only way to prevent others killing two innocent people is to kill a random innocent person yourself. Commonsense morality tells us that it is wrong to kill in these circumstances, and thereby endorses a deontic constraint on killing innocent people. Because they are commonsensical, deontic constraints have been endorsed by many moral philosophers and incorporated into many moral theories.1 However, philosophers endorsing deontic constraints have not always been clear about the exact form of the constraints they endorse. Yet, for any deontic constraint, there are several logically distinct rules that could produce that constraint. In this article I point out that some of these logically distinct rules are maximizing rules while others are non-maximizing rules. I then argue that the non-maximizing rules have a problem with moral advice. They appear to fail to give moral advice in cases where commonsense morality demands it. I look at several attempts to solve this problem and argue that they are all unsatisfactory. On these grounds, I conclude that if there are deontic constraints then they are maximizing rules. I then show that, given this conclusion, a strong case can be made that consequentialism provides the best account of deontic constraints.
1 For two very different ways of doing this see the deontic constraint friendly moral theories of Francis M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harms. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (New York Oxford University Press, 2011).
* Matthew Hammerton [email protected] 1
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903, Singapore
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2 Interpreting Constraints For any deontic constraint, there are several logically distinct rules that could produce it. To demonstrate this, I will first consider a constraint on promise-breaking and then generalize to all constraints. Consider the following case: TAXI: Sylvia has promised to attend her friend’s birthday party at 2 pm. She hails the last available taxi and is about to head off when she realizes that two nearby strangers also want the taxi. Each stranger also needs to be somewhere at 2 pm to keep a comparable promise to a friend. By chance the two strangers are heading to the same location, whereas Sylvia’s meeting is at the other end of town. If she takes the taxi for herself then she will keep her promise to her friend, but the two strangers will break their promises. If she allows the strangers to take the taxi then they will keep their promises but she will
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