Effects of a navigation spoofing signal on a receiver loop and a UAV spoofing approach
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Effects of a navigation spoofing signal on a receiver loop and a UAV spoofing approach Chao Ma1 · Jun Yang1 · Jianyun Chen1 · Zhi Qu1 · Chao Zhou1 Received: 3 May 2019 / Accepted: 25 April 2020 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract A civil navigation signal is vulnerable to interference and tampering owing to its open interface and low signal power. We focus on navigation spoofing. First, using a piecewise function, we quantitatively analyze the effects of the navigation spoofing signal on the receiver tracking loop. For a phase-locked loop, the spoofing signal extends the pull-in range of the discriminator. The autocorrelation gain of the spoofing signal has a different effect on the slope of the discriminator, depending on whether the discriminator is related to the signal amplitude. For the delay-locked loop, taking the non-coherent early minus late power method as an example, the unlocking condition and interval are analyzed quantitatively using the spoofing amplitude gain and the initial phase cosine of the spoofing and authentic carriers. A carrier frequency difference between the spoofing signal and authentic signal causes a phase jump and attenuation of the amplitude gain. Second, in luring an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to a designated location, we assume a UAV model and provide a spoofing strategy. Experimental results show that it is feasible to lure a civilian quadrotor UAV to a designated location about 50 m from where the UAV believes it is located. Keywords Navigation spoofing · Receiver loop · Unmanned aerial vehicle spoofing
Introduction In the early twenty-first century, the United States Department of Transportation assessed the vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS) (Volpe 2001). A leased WelNavigate GS720 navigation signal simulator was used to successfully trick a GPS civil receiver no more than 30 feet away (Warner and Johnston 2003). A flourishing period of research on spoofing began in 2008, when Humphreys et al. (2008) transformed the GRID receiver of Cornell University and realized a true spoofer based on the receiver–spoofer structure. With a focus on the spoofer, many confirmatory experiments and theoretical studies were carried out during 2008–2014. Typical tests include positioning deviation tests with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (Shepard et al. 2012a; Kerns et al. 2014) or yacht (Bhatti and Humphreys 2017) and timing deviation tests with a smart grid (Shepard * Jun Yang [email protected] 1
College of Intelligence Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, No. 109, Deya Road, Changsha 410073, China
et al. 2012b). The above experiments fully verify the feasibility and effectiveness of navigation spoofing. There is a basic agreement in the design of navigation spoofing systems (Humphreys et al. 2008; Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. 2012; Psiaki and Humphreys 2016). There are three categories of design. Simplistic designs use a navigation signal simulator, and a power amplifier and transmitt
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