Fascism and the Ukraine Crisis
Fascism is a convenient existential threat signifier for the post-Soviet space. With the larger role of the Great Patriotic War in Russian identity, it is an effective way to stir up a sense of ‘otherness’ in a variety of constructions. It is not surprisi
- PDF / 558,973 Bytes
- 21 Pages / 419.53 x 595.28 pts Page_size
- 45 Downloads / 209 Views
Fascism and the Ukraine Crisis
Fascism is often considered synonymous with existential threat, and with a historical Other. As a corollary, fighting fascism is equated with a higher moral ground, and not only in Russia. The narrative of a fascist existential threat is inextricably linked to the memory of World War II, which is remembered differently in Russia than it is in the rest of the world. The ‘Great Patriotic War’, as it is known, commemorates not just the defeat of fascism, but also the survival of the nation of Russia in the face of extinction. It is also the most important heroic and unifying event in recent Russian history and is now actively used in nation-building efforts (Gudkov 2005; Kucherenko 2011). Hitler and Nazi Germany represent an almost universal symbol for an existential threat in the Russian collective memory and these symbols are often used to show who is ‘on the wrong side of history’. This conceptualization of fascism came in handy in 2014. The events in Ukraine have become a litmus test for the mainstream Russian media, where Russian ‘memory entrepreneurs’ resorted to this powerful collective memory reference. Apart from calling the people on Maidan ‘fascists’ (associating them with an existential threat), mainstream Russian media made a connection between both the USA and the EU as aggressors and fascists—a common Soviet technique (see Chap. 5) especially popular in Soviet-era caricatures and rhetoric. Most Russians are familiar with the Great Patriotic War through education, transmission of family memories,
© The Author(s) 2017 E. Gaufman, Security Threats and Public Perception, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43201-4_5
103
104
E. GAUFMAN
literature and film, as well as through extensive commemoration rituals that usually start in kindergarten (Krylova 2004). This makes the Great Patriotic War a post-memory phenomenon (Hirsch 2008), particularly prone to being recounted in a mythologized narrative that started to take root under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the late 1960s (Gudkov 2005). Almost all cities have a World War II monument dedicated to the Unknown Soldier, or an Eternal Flame Monument. Thus, the Great Patriotic War is a narrative that is deeply embedded among Russians. Moreover, government-sponsored discourse on fascism is visibly present on social networks, as we shall see.
5.1
WORLD WAR II 2.0
The events in Ukraine dominated news reports in Russia throughout 2014, which were followed closely by most Russians (Levada 2015b). The main themes in social networks are rearticulated information shown on state television, often in a more aggressive reincarnation, for instance, using swear words and calling on the physical elimination of Ukrainians. As in most cases, even the choice of words can clearly identify the side that the speaker supports. The pro-Russian military units in South-Eastern Ukraine call themselves opolchency (militia men)—the term that is also used by the Russian media. Discursively, this term is associated not only with World War II and popular resista
Data Loading...
