Fire Compartment and Fire Barrier Evaluation in the NPP Fire PSA
During a fire, a reliable fire barrier could prevent fire and smoke from spreading into the adjacent areas within a nuclear power plant (NPP) building which may contain nuclear safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs). The damage of these
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Keywords Nuclear power plant Fire PSA compartment SSCs Screen 3 rooms
NUREG 6850 Fire barrier Fire
During a fire, a reliable fire barrier could prevent fire and smoke from spreading into the adjacent areas within a nuclear power plant (NPP) building which may contain nuclear safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs). The damage of these SSCs may lead to the failure of safe shutdown of the reactor during a severe fire event. A proper designed fire barrier system within NPP buildings will increase the safety performance and provide flexibility with future expansion.
1 Background—Fire PSA and NPP’s Fire Protection Goals Based on the IAEA guideline document [1], probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is considered to be an important tool for ensuring the safety of a nuclear power plant in relation to potential initiating events that can be caused by random component failure and human error, as well as internal and external hazards. A Level 1 PSA for internal fire is the probabilistic analysis of fire events occurring on the site of a nuclear power plant and their potential impact on safety. NUREG/CR-6850 [2] provides guidelines and detail evaluation method of the fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The principle objective of this requantification study is to develop a technical basis and methodology that will clarify issues affecting application of fire risk methods. The fire PRA will initially consider fire threats to safe shutdown primarily in the context of the defined fire compartY. Wu (&) AB Fire Safety Consultant Inc, 6047 105A Street, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6H 2P7 e-mail: dwu@abfire.ca URL: http://www.abfire.ca © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2017 H. Jiang (ed.), Proceedings of The 20th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2311-8_32
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ment. The results of the Fire PRA will be presented in terms of the risk contribution for fires confined to a single compartment and for fires that impact multiple adjacent compartments. The fire protection goal of the NPP could be characterized into three parts: • Life Safety • Nuclear Safety • Environmental safety. As occupant load within a NPP is considered low even during the outage/maintenance period, the powerhouse buildings within the NPP could be defined as “Special-Purpose Industrial Occupancy” under the NFPA 101 [3] that flexible egress design requirements such as travel distance, number of egress route were provided. When the means of egresses within the NPP were designed in accordance with the local building code and the referenced NFPA 101, and the egress facilities were maintained in accordance with the local fire code, it was considered the life safety protection goal could be achieved during a potential fire. It is the common requirement that a rated fire separation be provided for the radioactive material storage within the NPP. Considered the actual container storage of the new and used fuel bundles, it is considered unlikely that a potential fire could damage the container of the fuel bundles and releas
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