Forces in a true and physical sense: from mathematical models to metaphysical conclusions
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Forces in a true and physical sense: from mathematical models to metaphysical conclusions Corey Dethier1 Received: 26 October 2018 / Accepted: 9 January 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Wilson [Dialectica 63(4):525–554, 2009], Moore [Int Stud Philos Sci 26(4):359–380, 2012], and Massin [Br J Philos Sci 68(3):805–846, 2017] identify an overdetermination problem arising from the principle of composition in Newtonian physics. I argue that the principle of composition is a red herring: what’s really at issue are contrasting metaphysical views about how to interpret the science. One of these views—that real forces are to be tied to physical interactions like pushes and pulls—is a superior guide to real forces than the alternative, which demands that real forces are tied to “realized” accelerations. Not only is the former view employed in the actual construction of Newtonian models, the latter is both unmotivated and inconsistent with the foundations and testing of the science. Keywords Newtonian physics · Metaphysics of forces · Force composition · Newton · Overdetermination
1 Introduction The metaphysical interpretation of Newtonian mechanics is almost as old as the theory itself. One of the questions that arises in this domain is which forces we ought to believe in, given the assumption that a force-based interpretation of Newtonian mechanics is the right one. The philosophical literature has identified two candidates for the “real” (or causally efficacious) forces: the total or “resultant” forces, preferred due to their close connection with acceleration, and the forces that represent particular physical interactions (called “component forces”), preferred due to their presence in specific
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Corey Dethier [email protected] Philosophy Department, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
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force laws like the law of gravity.1 These two types of forces are related by the principle of composition, which says that the latter sum together to produce the former, and Wilson (2009), Moore (2012), and Massin (2017) have thus argued that Newtonian mechanics faces an overdetermination problem, as both types of forces are sufficient for the generation of observed accelerations. My interest in this debate is more interpretative than metaphysical: the question provides the opportunity for an interesting case study in how the formulations or applications of a science can provide evidence for particular metaphysical interpretations of that science. To this end, I focus on the historical foundations and practical uses of Newtonian physics: what metaphysical commitments do these features of the science support, and which do we impress upon them for other reasons? I argue for three main theses. First, that force composition, which serves as the explicit motivation for the prior literature, is a red herring: what really drives the overdetermination problem are metaphysical assumptions brought to the interpretation of Newtonian mechanics, not the theory itself (Sect. 2). Secon
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