Metaphysical and Conceptual Grounding

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Metaphysical and Conceptual Grounding Robert Smithson1  Received: 13 April 2017 / Accepted: 19 November 2018 © Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Abstract In this paper, I clarify the relation between two types of grounding: metaphysical and conceptual. Metaphysical grounding relates entities at more and less fundamental ontological levels. Conceptual grounding relates semantically primitive sentences and semantically derivative sentences. It is important to distinguish these relations given that both types of grounding can underwrite non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. In this paper, I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. I then present two heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant to a given case. These heuristics suggest that certain proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not actually involve metaphysical grounding at all. Keywords  Metaphysical grounding · Conceptual grounding · Non-causal explanation

1 Introduction Recently, many theorists have claimed that the world has an ordered, hierarchical structure. Entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically ground entities at higher ontological levels.1 It has also recently been claimed that our language has an ordered, hierarchical structure. Semantically primitive sentences are said to conceptually ground less primitive sentences.2 It is often emphasized that metaphysical grounding is a relation between things out in the world, not a relation between our sentences. But I will argue that not enough care has been taken to distinguish 1

  See, e.g., Schaffer (2009), Audi (2012a).   See Chalmers (2012, 452–460).

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* Robert Smithson [email protected] http://www.robertsmithsonphilosophy.com 1



Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 601 S. College Rd., Wilmington, NC 28403‑5601, USA

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these two types of grounding. Conflating these relations is easy to do, given that both types of grounding are expressed by non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. In Sect.  2, I will argue that there are indeed two distinct grounding relations expressed by non-causal “in-virtue of” claims. In Sects. 3, 4, I will argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. In Sect. 5, I will give some heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant in a given case. These heuristics suggest that many proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not involve metaphysical grounding at all. I will conclude by explaining why these results should interest both supporters and detractors of the study of metaphysical grounding.

2 Distinct Types of Grounding I will begin by describing metaphysical and conceptual grounding and the explanatory work each is supposed to perform. 2.1 Metaphysical Grounding I will follow the common str

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