Free will, the self, and video game actions
- PDF / 556,219 Bytes
- 7 Pages / 595.276 x 790.866 pts Page_size
- 101 Downloads / 349 Views
ORIGINAL PAPER
Free will, the self, and video game actions Andrew Kissel1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper, I raise several concerns for what I call the willing endorsement view ofmoral responsibility in videogames. Briefly, the willing endorsement view holds thatplayers are appropriate targets of moral judgments when their actions reflect their true,real-world selves. In the first section of the paper, I argue that core features of thewilling endorsement view are widely implicitly accepted among philosophers engagingin discussions of morality in games. I then focus on a particularly clear recent versionof the view defended by Christopher Bartel. In the second and third sections, I raiseseveral worries for Bartel’s version of the willing endorsement view. In the fourthsection, I argue that these worries are not unique to Bartel’s view, but instead resultfrom the view of identity implicit in the willing endorsement view. I conclude bysuggesting a path forward by rejecting this view of identity. Keywords Video games · Free will · Moral responsibility · Personal identity · Harry Frankfurt In 1993, a congressional hearing was called to evaluate violence in videogames such as Mortal Kombat, Night Trap, and Lethal Enforcers. The hearing focused on the question of whether increased violence in videogames leads to increased violence in players. As such, the primary focus was on whether videogames themselves, and their depictions, can be morally problematic. In 2018, following the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting, a roundtable discussion called by the president discussed the same issue.1 Are videogames themselves morally problematic?2 Of primary interest to these discussions is whether videogames can lead players to acts of real-world violence.3 This kind of moral panic is not unique to videogames. Parents in the 40 s and 50 s feared the influence of comic books, which gave way to fear of rock ‘n’ roll music in the 50 s and 60 s. Yet videogames seem different in that players participate in videogame content to a much greater degree than other forms of media. This raises an alternative question. Can playing a videogame be, in itself, morally problematic? More specifically, when (if ever) should a person be
morally assessed on the basis of actions they perform within the confines of a videogame?4 This question has been particularly pressing among philosophers in recent years due to widespread discussion of the gamer’s dilemma.5 The gamer’s dilemma describes the apparent tension in player attitudes towards different kinds of violence in videogames. According to the gamer’s dilemma, players tend to find many forms of gruesome violence in games acceptable on the grounds that “it’s just a game” and that they would never commit that kind of violence in reality. However, these same players also tend to find cases of virtual sexual violence, such as the in-game pedophilia and rape in games like RapeLay (2006), morally repugnant. The gamer’s dilemma is one illustration of a wider phenomenon. In so
Data Loading...
