Garett Jones: 10 Percent Less Democracy. Why Should You Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less
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Garett Jones: 10 Percent Less Democracy. Why Should You Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020. Hardcover (ISBN 9781503603578) € 26. 248 Pp. Paolo Bodini 1 Accepted: 12 June 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Laffer curve is a term used in the field of economics. It characterizes the theoretical relationship between tax rates and tax revenue and is represented graphically as an upside-down U. This representation reflects that tax revenue grows as tax rates grow. However, across the peak of the upside-down U, things change, and higher taxation leads to less revenue. Garett Jones, professor in economics at the George Mason University, borrows this concept to describe the connection between “level of democracy” and “quality of outcomes”. Similarly, as with taxation, increasing democracy is associated with better outcomes (peace, prosperity), but, beyond the peak, more democracy means worse political outcomes. Jones argues that rich democracies have crossed this peak. To improve their policies, to find their own sweet spot, they should take a step back and reduce their democratic rate—just 10% less. Jones’ philosophical point is to reject the thesis, that challenges to democracy must be faced with more democracy, as if this form of government could save itself from drowning by pulling its own hair like Baron Munchausen. It is not like that—contends Jones. Rather, alternatives should be considered to outline a more foresighted public process of decisionmaking. From this perspective, the author upholds an “epistocratic” approach, promoting seven measures to reduce the democratic rate. Jones backs his proposals with extensive data and trends, dealing carefully with empirical literature and supporting his arguments with a well-documented attention towards anecdotal evidence. These measures are divided into two sets of groups according to their viability, where the second one embodies a more speculative approach. The first set includes four solutions: longer terms for representatives; more independent central banks; nominated, not elected, judges and regulatory agencies and more weight to informed group of voters. Longer terms would reduce pressure on the representatives, curb their longing for visibility and redirect their focus from reelection back on to long-run policies.
* Paolo Bodini [email protected]; [email protected]
1
Department of Law “Cesare Beccaria”, University of Milan, Milan, Italy
P. Bodini
Jones refers to comparative studies to show that independent central bankers, protected from political pressures, are more likely to ensure low and stable inflation rate than functionaries reporting to government. Likewise, nominated judges and officials (like city treasurers or regulators) outperform their elected colleagues and provide better outcomes if acting independently from political conditioning. On the one hand, nominated judges in the USA do not tend to favour home-state citizens, e.g. they do not decide more generous awards whe
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