Hardware Architectures for Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes

This book explores C-based design, implementation, and analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms for signature generation and verification.  The authors investigate NIST round 2 PQC algorithms for signature generation and signature verif

  • PDF / 5,168,357 Bytes
  • 185 Pages / 439.371 x 683.151 pts Page_size
  • 27 Downloads / 227 Views

DOWNLOAD

REPORT


hitectures for Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes

Hardware Architectures for Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes

Deepraj Soni • Kanad Basu • Mohammed Nabeel Najwa Aaraj • Marc Manzano • Ramesh Karri

Hardware Architectures for Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes

123

Deepraj Soni NYU Tandon School of Engineering New York, NY, USA Mohammed Nabeel Research Engineer at the Center for Cyber Security NewYork University Abu Dhabi (CCS-NYUAD) Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Marc Manzano Executive Director of the Cryptography Research Centre Technology Innovation Institute (TII) Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Kanad Basu Department of Computer Engineering University of Texas Dallas, TX, USA Najwa Aaraj Chief Research Officer Technology Innovation Institute (TII) Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Ramesh Karri Electrical and Computer Engineering New York University Brooklyn, NY, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-57681-3 ISBN 978-3-030-57682-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57682-0 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword by Daniel Apon

Public-key cryptography was initiated in the mid-1970s by the revolutionary work of Whit Diffie and Martin Hellman. At that time, the development of the first cheap digital hardware freed the age-old art of cryptography from the limitations of hands-on mechanical computing and the physical distribution of sensitive messages. The low cost of deploying high-grade hardware rendered cryptography useful for commercial applications such as automated teller machines (ATMs) and personal computing devices. There was a new and inherent need for two parties to transmit information to one another inexpensively and e