How to choose a fair delegation?
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How to choose a fair delegation? Burak Can1
· Péter Csóka2,3 · Emre Ergin4
Received: 6 January 2020 / Accepted: 16 September 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek Pareto optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules is characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below 0.5t . For instance, a delegation of size two should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected. Keywords Aggregation rules · Committee selection · Conflict management · Kemeny distance · Strategy-proofness JEL Classification C70 · D71
Burak Can: This work is mostly financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under the Grant with Project No. 451-13-017 (VENI, 2014) and partially by Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg. The support of both institutes, therefore, is gratefully acknowledged. Péter Csóka was supported by the ÚNKP-16-4-III New National Excellence Program of the Ministry of Human Capacities and by the Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal - NKFIH, K-120035.
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Burak Can [email protected] Péter Csóka [email protected] Emre Ergin [email protected]
1
Department of Data Analytics and Digitalisation, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2
Department of Finance, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
3
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary
4
Department of Economics, Bolu Abant ˙Izzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey
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1 Introduction In many situations, individuals participate in collective decision making via a committee of representatives or delegates, i.e., there is a double-layered aggregation of individual opinions. Consider, for instance, voting for political candidates in elections to represent one’s opinion in a parliament. Board decisions in large corporations are also taken collectively via a committee representing different departments, albeit not every department is allocated a seat at the board. Correspondingly, peace conferences and negotiations over conflict zones require delegates to be sent by different interest groups or ethnicities involved in a civil war. The choice of which interest group or ethnicity to invite to the conference, however, is not very straightforward—especially not in extremely heterogeneous, polarized, or divided societies. In fact, the way in which peace conferences are set also signals the possible effectiveness of these talks. In many settings, delegates representing their interest groups (or c
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