Justifying method choice: a heuristic-instrumentalist account of scientific methodology
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Justifying method choice: a heuristic-instrumentalist account of scientific methodology Till Grüne-Yanoff1 Received: 30 November 2018 / Accepted: 17 November 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Scientific methods are heuristic in nature. Heuristics are simplifying, incomplete, underdetermined and fallible problem-solving rules that can nevertheless serve certain goals in certain contexts better than truth-preserving algorithms. Because of their goal- and context-dependence, a framework is needed for systematic choosing between them. This is the domain of scientific methodology. Such a methodology, I argue, relies on a form of instrumental rationality. Three challenges to such an instrumentalist account are addressed. First, some authors have argued that the rational choice of at least some methods, namely those supporting belief formation, is not goal-dependent. Second, some authors have observed that some method choices seem intuitively rational, even though relevant goals are lacking. Thirdly, some authors have argued that instrumental rationality itself depends on a goal-independent form of rationality. It is the heuristic nature of scientific methods that affords me the arguments against these challenges. This heuristic-instrumentalist account provides the means-ends analysis needed to evaluate heuristic method choice. The paper thus offers the conceptual basis for a scientific methodology that is both compatible with the heuristic nature of actual scientific practice and also normatively relevant for assessing method choice. Keywords Methodology · Heuristics · Instrumental rationality · Epistemology
1 Introduction Scientific methods are those techniques, approaches and strategies that scientists employ to perform their research. These methods can serve different epistemic goals, for example different versions of explanation, prediction or design. An instrumentalist methodology describes, compares and evaluates these methods with respect to their
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Till Grüne-Yanoff [email protected] Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Teknikringen 76, 10044 Stockholm, Sweden
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ability to further relevant epistemic goals. Through that it supports rational method choice. Specifically, such an instrumentalist position makes two claims. First, it claims that the sources of normativity for prescribing the choice of certain methods are located in the instrumentality of these methods for certain epistemic goals. Second, it claims that a systematic prescription of method choice can be derived from these instrumentalist considerations. An instrumentalist account of scientific methodology is desirable because it relies on a normatively unproblematic notion of rationality that nevertheless offers a powerful tool for evaluating and performing method choice. Yet this instrumentalist perspective is contested in at least three ways. First, certain authors claim that the rational choice of at least some methods, namely those supporting belief formation, is not goal-dependent. Second, others have observed
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