Making European Merger Policy More Predictable
Making European Merger Policy More Predictable analyses European Merger Control with regard to its capacity to generate predictability among the concerned parties. Starting from the premise that predictability is of overwhelming importance for the functio
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Making European Merger Policy More Predictable By
Stefan Voigt University of Kassel, Germany and
André Schmidt University of Göttingen, Germany
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 1-4020-3089-4 (HB) ISBN 1-4020-3090-8 (e-book)
Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by Springer, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Springer, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2005 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
xi
CHAPTER I: PREDICTABILITY AS A CRUCIAL CONDITION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
1
1. Introductory Remarks
1
2. Some Theoretical Considerations Concerning Predictability
1
3. Some Empirical Results Concerning Predictability
3
4. The Predictability of European Merger Policy 4.1. A Survey Amongst Large European Firms 4.1.1. Before Notification 4.1.2. After notification
5 8 9 10
5. Proposals for Improving Predictability
11
CHAPTER II: DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPETITION THEORY
13
1. Introductory Remarks
13
2. The Harvard Approach 2.1. Main Points 2.2. Policy Implications 2.3. Critique
13 14 16 16
3. The Chicago Approach 3.1. Main Points 3.2. Policy Implications 3.3. Critique
18 18 20 21
4. Contestability Theory 4.1. Main Points 4.2. Policy Implications 4.3. Critique
22 22 24 24
5. The Contribution of Game Theory: the New Industrial Organisation 5.1. Game Components 5.2. Advantages of Using Game Theory in Competition Theory 5.3. Critique Concerning the Use of Game Theory in Competition Theory
24 25 25 27
v
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
6. The Contribution of The New Institutional Economics: Transaction Cost Economics 6.1. Transactions and Transaction Costs 6.2. Assumptions of Transaction Cost Economics 6.3. Policy Implications
28 29 30 32
7. In lieu of a summary: Consensus and Dissensus Between the Various Approaches
34
CHAPTER III: TRENDS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
39
1. Liberalisation as a Driving Force of Globalisation 1.1. General Trends 1.1.1. Liberalisation within nation-states 1.1.2. Liberalisation by regional integration 1.1.3. Liberalisation on a worldwide scale 1.2. Sector-Specific Liberalisation 1.2.1. Liberalisation of goods markets 1.2.2. Liberalisation of capital markets 1.2.3. Facilitation of Foreign Direct Investment 1.2.4. Liberalisation of service markets
40 40 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 45
2. Economic and Technological Factors 2.1. Rapid Technological Change 2.2. Increasing Mobility of S
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