Mark Williams (ed.): The Political Economy of Competition Law in Asia . Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, 2013. pp.

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Mark Williams (ed.): The Political Economy of Competition Law in Asia. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/ Northampton, 2013. pp. 438. ISBN-13: 978-1781001677. £94.50 Rupprecht Podszun

Published online: 8 January 2014  Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Munich 2013

When thinking about the relationship of politics and competition law, longestablished competition law regimes have their tales to tell. For instance, rumor has it that the officials in the Directorate General for Competition in Brussels sometimes prepare two decisions for politically sensitive cases: the decision is taken by the European Commission itself, a political body that may come to a vote that differs from what the case-handlers recommend. In the United States, the influence of the government and the influence of big companies on the government affect individual cases. Look at the Microsoft investigation to see how the people in power promote or hinder their enforcers. The book under review does not look at such superficial anecdotal evidence to explore the role of competition law in society – it digs deeper. Editor Mark Williams, a law professor from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and one of the leading figures in the Asian competition law community, claims in the introduction that the effectiveness of a competition law regime is determined, to a large extent, by the latent political economy features of the specific jurisdiction […] it is essential to understand these issues in some depth when assessing the likely success or failure of a competition law achieving pro-competitive outcomes beneficial to the inhabitants. His aim is to analyze the socio-economic factors that set the foundation for the enforcement of competition law. Put differently: does it have an impact on current merger control that King Chulalongkorn of Thailand set up a central administration in 1893? And does it matter for cartel prosecution that Singapore separated from the Malaysian federation in 1963? Do the yearly typhoons in the Philippines deal a blow to competition law enforcement in the country? R. Podszun (&) Professor for Civil Law, Intellectual Property and Economic Law (University of Bayreuth); Affiliated Research Fellow Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Marstallplatz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

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The Political Economy of Competition Law in Asia

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This is a remarkable book since it lures the reader into thinking about such questions. It is self-evident that definite answers to these questions cannot be provided in the course of 438 pages. But why not make a start? Mark Williams assembled 11 country reports. In each of these 30-or-so-pagers, the authors explore the history, the political causes, the economic background and the future expectations for competition laws in the country under consideration. The geographic focus is on Asia, where Japan (covered by Toshiaki Takigawa) and Korea (Jaemin Lee) feature long-established competition law regimes. Other countries in the regio