Mechanisms and Causal Histories: Explanation-Oriented Research in Human Ecology
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Mechanisms and Causal Histories: Explanation-Oriented Research in Human Ecology Bradley B Walters 1
&
Andrew P. Vayda 2
Accepted: 18 November 2020 / Published online: 16 December 2020 # The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract Many philosophers and scientists now view the discovery of causal mechanisms as central to research and explanation. In this paper, we consider the relevance of this mechanistic approach to human ecology. The consensus is that mechanisms are relatively stable and recurring causal structures underlying the phenomena we are trying to understand or explain. A causal sequence with a particular end point can be understood as constituting a causal history explanation, but claims for it also constituting a mechanism require additional evidence concerning its stability and regularity. Organizing research around the search for mechanisms often makes sense in fields like biology, sociology, and political science where stable causal structures are commonplace. But it makes less sense for human ecology because interactions between people and the environment are often characterized by unstable and contingent causal dynamics. The more serviceable concept of cause, not causal mechanism, should thus be maintained at the core of explanation, and research in human ecology should prioritize the search for causal histories, with causal mechanisms serving a potentially supporting role. These arguments are illustrated with a case study of land use change and reforestation in the Caribbean. Keywords Explanation . Research methodology . Causal mechanisms . Causal histories . Pragmatics . Land use change . Reforestation . Bananas . Saint Lucia . Caribbean
Introduction In our view, explanation-oriented research in human ecology is fundamentally about answering why-questions. We seek to understand why certain things happen or change, or why things don’t happen or change as expected. We ask ‘why’ because we are curious to know how the world works, but also to reveal information that can inform models or policy. Understanding why things have happened or why people have been behaving the way they have helps us to see future possibilities and to direct outcomes. Scientists and philosophers have long debated what constitutes explanation, but a broad consensus makes the search for causes now central to it (Woodward 2003; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). There remain disagreements about the
* Bradley B Walters [email protected] 1
Mount Allison University, Sackville N.B. E4L1A7, Canada
2
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
ontology of cause and metaphysics of causation, topics mostly beyond the scope of this paper (Woodward 2015; Rohlfing and Zuber 2019). However, a significant development in recent decades is the ascendency of a view that makes elucidation of so-called causal ‘mechanisms’ central to explanation. Variously labelled either the ‘new mechanistic philosophy’ or the ‘mechanistic’ perspective, adherents share
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