Models and Methods for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games in Economic Management
This book proposes several commonly used interval-valued solution concepts of interval-valued cooperative games with transferable utility. It thoroughly investigates these solutions, thereby establishing the properties, models, methods, and applications.
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Models and Methods for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games in Economic Management
Models and Methods for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games in Economic Management
Deng-Feng Li
Models and Methods for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games in Economic Management
Deng-Feng Li School of Economics and Management Fuzhou University Fuzhou, Fujian, China
ISBN 978-3-319-28996-0 ISBN 978-3-319-28998-4 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28998-4
(eBook)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015960954 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
To my wife, Wei Fei, and to my son, Wei-Long Li
Preface
Cooperative games with transferable utility are simply called cooperative games in this book. The cooperative game theory is an important branch of the game theory and has been extensively studied. In (crisp or classical) cooperative games, values (or characteristic functions, payoffs) of coalitions of players are expressed with exact values (i.e., real numbers). However, due to uncertainty and information imprecision in real situations, coalitions’ values usually have to be estimated. Recently, intervals are used to estimate inherited imprecision or vagueness in coalitions’ values, and hereby there appears an important type of cooperative games with interval data (or interval uncertainty), which often are called intervalvalued cooperative games for short. A good example may be the bankruptcy problem with interval data. Interval-valued cooperative games are remarkably different from (classical or crisp) cooperative games since their coalitions’ values are expressed with intervals rather than real numbers. Recently, some researchers such as S. Z. Alparslan G€ok, R. Branzei, O. Branzei, D. Dimitrov, and S. Tijs paid attention to interval-valued cooperative game
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