Nihilism, But Not Necessarily
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Nihilism, But Not Necessarily Naomi Dershowitz1 Received: 15 May 2018 / Accepted: 1 July 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract It’s widely accepted that we have most reason to accept theories that best fulfill the following naturalistically respectable criteria: (1) internal consistency, (2) consistency with the facts, and (3) exemplification of the theoretical virtues. It’s also widely accepted that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. I argue that if you accept the aforementioned criteria, you have most reason to reject that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. By applying the criteria to worlds that are all prima facie possible, I show that contingent local matters of particular fact partly determine which theory of composition we should accept at a world. For instance, I argue that when we apply the criteria to our world, we should accept Mereological Nihilism. Furthermore, even if you think that the worlds I mention, such as gunky worlds, are impossible, you should still reject the brute principle that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. Instead, you should only accept that a theory of composition is necessarily true if contingent local matters of particular fact at possible worlds cannot tell in favor of one theory of composition over another.
1 Introduction Scientists and metaphysicians alike typically accept that the best theory is that which best exhibits the following set of naturalistically respectable criteria: (1) internal consistency, (2) consistency with the facts, and (3) exemplification of the theoretical virtues. In addition, it’s metaphysical orthodoxy that true metaphysical theories are necessarily true. I argue that principles of material composition are contingently true by applying the aforementioned criteria at different prima facie possible worlds. If you accept that the best theory is the theory that best exhibits (1)–(3), then the contingent local matters of particular fact at different possible worlds give us most reason to accept different theories of composition at different worlds. The special composition question asks ‘when do two or more objects compose a further object?’ (Van Inwagen 1990). There are, broadly speaking, three ways of * Naomi Dershowitz [email protected] 1
Syracuse University, New York, USA
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answering this question: that any collection of two or more objects always compose a further object (Mereological Universalism), that no objects compose a further object (Mereological Nihilism), or that only some collections of objects compose a further object (Compositional Restrictivism).1 I argue that we have most reason to accept the theory of composition—Mereological Universalism, Mereological Nihilism, or Compositional Restrictivism—that best satisfies the aforementioned criteria at a world. I apply the aforementioned criteria to three kinds of prima facie possible worlds. First, I apply it to a non-gunky world without emergent properties. A gunky world has at least one gunky object. An object is gunky i
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