Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles
- PDF / 501,470 Bytes
- 22 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 9 Downloads / 237 Views
Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles Holly Kantin1 Received: 4 April 2018 / Accepted: 27 August 2018 © Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract One of the main motivations for compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite material objects, concerns the many puzzles and problems associated with them. Nihilists claim that eliminating composites provides a unified solution to a slew of varied, difficult problems. However, numerous philosophers have questioned whether this is really so. While nihilists clearly avoid the usual, composite-featuring formulations of the puzzles, the concern is that the commitments that generate the problems are not eliminated along with composites. If this is correct, it severely undercuts the motivation for the view. However, I argue that it is not correct. The aim of this paper is to explain exactly how and why eliminating composites dissolves substantive metaphysical puzzles. More generally, I aim to clarify the nihilist’s ontological commitments and the scope of the paraphrase strategy she employs. Keywords Compositional nihilism · Mereological nihilism · Composite objects · Material coincidence · Special composition question
B 1
Holly Kantin [email protected] College of Arts and Sciences, The University of Alabama, Box 870218, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0218, USA
123
Synthese
1 Introduction Compositional nihilism is the view that there are no composite material objects.1,2 Nihilists typically accept the existence of mereological simples—material objects without proper parts—and hold that simples can be arranged in all sorts of ways and collectively instantiate properties of varying complexity. However, nihilists deny that simples ever compose a further object. Nihilists insist that their view is not as radical as it initially seems. While they deny that there are tables, trees, or people, they do not think that ordinary belief in composite objects (henceforth, composites) is due to some sort of mass hallucination. On the contrary, nihilists claim to accept many of the same composite-free facts about the material world that believers in composites (henceforth, believers) accept. For example, in a case where the believer will say that some simples compose a table, the nihilist will agree that the simples collectively instantiate a complex assortment of properties that we associate with tables.3 In other words, when it comes to how matter is arranged and what properties are collectively instantiated by simples, the nihilist accepts the same composite-free facts as the believer. However, the nihilist denies the move from “there are simples collectively instantiating f -ish properties” to “those simples compose an f ” (where f is a composite object sortal). If nihilists can accept many of the same composite-free facts about the world as believers, then nihilism sounds more plausible than it might have initially. However, it has been questioned whether this gain in plausibility comes at the cost of efficacy. Nihilists want to minimize the differences between the facts they a
Data Loading...
