NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts: a simple game-theoretic analysis
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NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts: a simple game‑theoretic analysis Sen Eguchi1 Received: 21 December 2019 / Accepted: 11 July 2020 © The Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International 2020
Abstract This study addresses so-called NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts around the siting of a facility that produces local public goods/services for the residents of one region but transfers the environmental costs to surrounding areas (subregions). Residents usually agree on the need for such a NIMBY facility but oppose its construction in their neighborhood, making the siting of the facility difficult. Assuming a region with a local government and two areas having one resident each, we formulate a two-person normal form game in which the government sites a new NIMBY facility in either of the two areas while considering the residents’ opinions on the most suitable site for the facility. Our analysis shows that in such a game, residents experience either the Prisoner’s Dilemma or War of Attrition, leading to the emergence of NIMBY conflicts. Keywords NIMBY · Game theory · Prisoner’s dilemma · War of attrition · War on garbage JEL Classification C72 · D74 · R53
1 Introduction A region or town usually consists of distinct areas or districts, such as “uptown” and “downtown.” Typically, certain types of local public goods/services are produced in a facility, such as an incinerator constructed in one of these distinct areas. Some of the production costs associated with such facilities, especially environmental costs (e.g., the noisy environment around the factory), are borne solely by the residents of the area in which the facility is built, although the public goods/services produced in the factory are consumed equally by residents across the region. For this reason, * Sen Eguchi [email protected] 1
Faculty of Economics, Niigata Sangyo University, 4730 Karuigawa, Kashiwazaki, Niigata 945‑1393, Japan
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science
when a government plans to construct a facility that produces local public goods/ services, controversy often arises among residents about where the facility should be sited. Residents often resort to the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) argument, in which they agree on the necessity for a facility but oppose its construction in the area in which they reside, thereby making the siting of the facility difficult. This study addresses such NIMBY conflicts.1 In this study, we consider a model of a region consisting of two residential areas, both of which are potential candidates for a new NIMBY facility proposed by the local government. When deciding the site for the facility, a resident (one in each area) is asked by the government for his or her opinion (either “welcome” or “oppose”) on siting the facility in the area where he or she lives; the site for the facility is determined only when an agreement is reached between the two players (one player “opposes” and the other “welcomes” the decision to site the facility in his or her area).
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