No Problem of Consistent Incompatible Desires: a Reply to Baumann
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No Problem of Consistent Incompatible Desires: a Reply to Baumann Daniel Coren 1 Received: 24 August 2020 / Accepted: 20 October 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In a brief and deeply interesting 2017 Acta Analytica paper, Peter Baumann argues that there are cases of necessarily incompatible but mutually consistent desires, that this is a common problem, and that there is no solution in sight. I will argue that Baumann needs to make some additional assumptions in order to support his claim that there are necessarily incompatible and mutually consistent desires; if they do exist, then they are sometimes beneficial; and if they are sometimes involved with problematic outcomes, then the mere presence of incompatibility and consistency does not cause the subject to frustrate the (more) beneficial desire.
1 Introduction In a brief and deeply interesting 2017 Acta Analytica paper, Peter Baumann argues that there are cases where we cannot get what we want, that this is a common problem, and that there is no solution in sight. Specifically, Baumann argues for four theses (where BT = Baumann’s Thesis): BT1: There are cases where a subject, S, has desires that are both mutually consistent and necessarily incompatible; that is, there are cases where S cannot get what S wants because S has specific, indexical desires for X and a necessarily incompatible desire for not-X, and yet we cannot derive a contradiction from the set of all of those desires. BT2: The cases referred to in BT1 present a problem. BT3: The cases referred to in BT1 are not rare (so, the problem isn’t rare either). BT4: There is no solution in sight to the problem referred to in BT2 (and, implicitly, from BT3 it follows that we have no solution in sight for a nonrare problem).
* Daniel Coren [email protected]
1
Philosophy Department, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
D. Coren
I will argue for four theses in response (where MT = My Thesis): MT1: If BT1 is true then it requires non-trivial assumptions that Baumann does not identify. MT2: Contra Baumann, there are many ordinary cases of incompatible consistent desires where the desire that is necessarily frustrated is more harmful than the desires that are satisfied. MT3: Even in cases where the desires that are satisfied are more harmful that the desire that is frustrated, there is no obvious reason to think that the mere fact that there is consistency (and necessary incompatibility between the desires in any way causes S to frustrate the less harmful desire). MT4: So, Baumann has not yet given us persuasive reasons to think that there is a problem of consistent necessarily incompatible desires. In Section 2, I will explain BT1 and motivate MT1. Mutatis mutandis for Sections 3, 4, and 5. In short, I will argue that if there is a problem of consistent incompatible desires then it is not the problem that Baumann identifies.
2 Assumptions Required for Consistent Incompatible Desires: BT1 and MT1 Baumann argues that there are cases where a person’s desires are mutually consistent yet
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