Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action
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Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action Samuel Asarnow1 Received: 5 September 2019 / Accepted: 26 October 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Noncognitivism about normative judgment is the view that normative judgment is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desirelike in its functional role and direction of fit. Noncognitivism about intention (also called the “distinctive practical attitude” theory) is the view that intention is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. While these theories are alike in several ways, they have rarely been discussed in concert. This paper studies the relation between these two theories, focusing on the question of whether noncognitivism about intention faces an analogue of the well-known Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism about normative judgment. I argue that whether it faces the Frege-Geach problem depends on how it treats the distinction between what Anscombe called expressions of intention and personal predictions. I show that there is substantial pressure to treat that distinction as semantic, and that a variant of the Frege-Geach problem arises for versions of noncognitivism about intention that go this route. Yet some philosophers of action may be willing to resist this pressure, and I develop a pragmatic account of the distinction that would allow such philosophers to avoid the Frege-Geach problem altogether. I argue that this pragmatic account has significant independent appeal. Notably, it provides a way for noncognitivists about intention to undercut the force of a recent argument for cognitivism due to Berislav Marušić and John Schwenkler.
1 Introduction According to a broadly Humean approach to psychology and action, a complete understanding of human motivation and action can be given by positing exactly two types of mental states, beliefs and desires, which are (as Hume might have said) distinct existences. Some philosophers challenge the mutual exclusivity of this distinction, positing “besires” that simultaneously count as both belief and desire. Others * Samuel Asarnow [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Ave, St. Paul, MN 55105, USA
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dispute the distinction’s exhaustiveness, positing the existence of additional mental state types.1 Two influential positions in metaethics and the philosophy of action fall in the latter camp. Noncognitivists about normative judgment argue that a plausible account of normative thought (and, by extension, normative language) requires enriching the Humean picture. They claim normative judgment is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire.2 While it is desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit, it also has belief-like characteristics, such as being subject to requirements of rationality.3 Noncognitivism about normative judgment (NNJ) contrasts
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