Human Agency and Neural Causes Philosophy of Action and the Neurosci
Human Agency and Neural Causes provides an analysis of our everyday thought about our conduct, and the neuroscience research concerning voluntary agency. J.D. Runyan argues that our findings through neuroscience are consistent with what would be expected
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Human Agency and Neural Causes Philosophy of Action and the Neuroscience of Voluntary Agency J. D. Runyan Indiana Wesleyan University, USA
Palgrave
macmillan
© Jason Douglas Runyan 2014 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-32948-6 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-46060-1 ISBN 978-1-137-32949-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137329493 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.
To S., D., and E.
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Contents List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgements
x
1 Introduction 1.1 What is at issue 1.2 An outline of the work ahead 1.3 A different approach to a familiar topic: Undercutting the contemporary compatibilist/ incompatibilist debate
1 1 6
2 Libet-Style Experiments and Volitions 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Libet-style experiments and the problem they present for volitional accounts 2.3 Volitional rebuttals to Libet-style problems 2.4 Conceptual and empirical grounds for rejecting volitional accounts 2.5 Conclusions
16 16
3 The 3.1 3.2 3.3
45 45 46
Need for an Analysis of Human Agency Introduction Volitional accounts, action and awareness An analytic approach reaffirming a broadly-Aristotelian account of human agency and voluntary conduct 3.4 Conclusions
9
18 23 30 42
53 55
4 An Aristotelian Account of Human Agency 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Wants and choices 4.3 Human agency 4.4 Awa
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