On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires
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On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires Daniel Skibra1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The view that dominates the literature on intentional attitudes holds that beliefs and desires both have propositional content. A commitment to what I call “content uniformity” underlies this view. According to content uniformity, beliefs and desires are but different psychological modes having a uniform kind of content. Prima facie, the modes don’t place any constraint on the kinds of content the attitude can have. I challenge this consensus by pointing out an asymmetry between belief contents and desire contents which shows content uniformity to be mistaken. I do this by revisiting the arguments of Richard (Philosophical Studies, 39(1): 1–13, 1981), and show that arguments which purport to show the temporal specificity of belief contents yield the opposite results for desire contents. I defend this preliminary conclusion from various strategies to neutralize the asymmetry claim. My defense provides occasions to respond to objections by Brogaard (2012) and Recanati (2007) to the Richard argument, and to get clearer on the role of temporal adjuncts in desire ascriptions. Finally, I consider whether the construal of attitude content as centered propositions (as in Lewis Philosophical Review, 88(4): 513–543, 1979) can be invoked to vindicate content uniformity. My conclusion is that while the framework itself doesn’t vindicate content uniformity, it could, but only if it availed itself of a further, substantive thesis about desire, which itself is in need of defense. This work was presented at the University of Illinois, at the 2017 meeting of the Illinois Philosophical Association at Northern Illinois University, at the 2018 Central APA, and at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy at the University of Connecticut in 2018. I’ve received helpful comments by Brittney Currie and Kyle Dickey at two of these events. I recall conversations about this material with Geoff Giorgi, Emily McWilliams, Peter van Elswyk, Tyler Hanck, Nader Shoaibi, Sam Fleischacker, Deborah Haar, William Lycan, Bruno Whittle, Peter Baumann, Gregory Ward, Andrei Moldovan, Adrian Bricui, and Victor Verdejo that impacted my thinking about the subject matter. Michael Glanzberg and Fabrizio Cariani read multiple drafts and provided valuable discussions. Finally, I thank the reviewers for this journal—in particular “reviewer 2”, who (contra their fabled reputation—de dicto, at least) provided particularly insightful comments that prompted me to rethink entire sections much to the paper’s benefit, and Paul Egr´e, who provided sage editorial advice. Daniel Skibra
[email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Kresge 3512, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
D. Skibra
Keywords Propositions · Content · Belief · Desire · Intentional attitudes · Attitude ascriptions
1 Introduction Let’s say you want to share a tasty meal at a restaurant with friend, and then you do. This being so, you form the b
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