Nonbayesian Decision Theory Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Actio
This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should
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Theory and Decision Library A
Non-Bayesian Decision Theory Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY General Editor: Julian Nida-Rümelin (Universita¨t Mu¨nchen) Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research SERIES A: PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES VOLUME 44
Assistant Editor: Martin Rechenauer (Universita¨t Mu¨nchen) Editorial Board: Raymond Boudon (Paris), Mario Bunge (Montréal ), Isaac Levi (New York), Richard V. Mattessich (Vancouver), Bertrand Munier (Cachan), Amartya K. Sen (Cambridge), Brian Skyrms (Irvine), Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz) Scope: This series deals with the foundations, the general methodology and the criteria, goals and purpose of the social sciences. The emphasis in the Series A will be on well-argued, thoroughly analytical rather than advanced mathematical treatments. In this context, particular attention will be paid to game and decision theory and general philosophical topics from mathematics, psychology and economics, such as game theory, voting and welfare theory, with applications to political science, sociology, law and ethics.
For other titles published in this series, go to www.springer.com/series/6616
Martin Peterson
NON-BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action
ABC
Martin Peterson Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Cambridge Cambridge, CB2 3RH
ISBN 978-1-4020-8698-4
e-ISBN 978-1-4020-8699-1
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008928678 c 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, micro lming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
Preface
For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic community to such an extent that alternative, non-Bayesian positions are seldom extensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents maximise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consid
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