Partner Choice and Cooperation in Networks Theory and Experimental E
Cooperation is beneficial but may be hard to achieve in situations where the selfish interests of individuals conflict with their common goal, such as in sharing of goods, help, knowledge or information, in trade and pollution negotiations, and in exploit
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Aljaˇz Ule
Partner Choice and Cooperation in Networks Theory and Experimental Evidence
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Dr. Aljaˇz Ule Roetersstraat 11 1018 WB Amsterdam The Netherlands [email protected]
ISBN 978-3-540-73015-6
e-ISBN 978-3-540-73016-3
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-73016-3 Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ISSN 0075-8442 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007938262
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Production: LE-TEX Jelonek, Schmidt & Vöckler GbR, Leipzig Cover design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper 987654321 springer.com
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Preface
In this book the methods of game theory and experimental economics are applied to investigate the dynamics of cooperation in endogenously formed networks. This investigation is motivated by two observations regarding a traditional assumption in game theoretic models of social dilemmas that participants in such a dilemma have no other option but to engage. One observation is that these models fail to capture an important element of human interaction, as people are in general free to select their interaction partners. The other observation is that partner choice may increase cooperation through exclusion of free-riders. Intuitively, people seek helpful other people for interaction. Cooperative individuals may therefore acquire more interaction partners and earn higher benefits from their interaction network than the individuals who try to free-ride on the others’ cooperative contributions. Consequently, cooperative behavior may become profitable, inducing even the selfish individuals to cooperate. Thus motivated, a social dilemma with partner choice is introduced in the book. It allows exploration of simultaneous dynamics of the network structure and cooperative behavior on this structure. Its analysis shows that partner choice leads to networks where free-riders are likely to be excluded and confirms our intuition that free partner choice strongly facilitates cooperation. The research presented in this book has been conducted while I was a graduate student at the Tinbergen Institute and at CREED, the Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political DecisionMaking at the University of Amsterdam.
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