Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus
- PDF / 252,151 Bytes
- 24 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 48 Downloads / 221 Views
Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus Milena Ivanova • Cedric Paternotte
Received: 13 December 2011 / Accepted: 18 August 2012 / Published online: 8 September 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science.
1 Introduction There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agentbased rather than rule-based. Such a solution goes back to Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. It was recently revived by David Stump, because of the crucial role that intellectual and moral virtues play in it, and has since attracted significant attention. Duhem defined good sense as what guides scientists facing the problem of theory choice—that is, who have to choose between theories equally compatible with the data. Nevertheless, he never provided a full account of good sense. Recent papers have tried to fill this gap by reconstructing good sense and explaining how Authors are listed in alphabetical order only. This paper is fully co-authored. M. Ivanova C. Paternotte (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 43 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UU, UK e-mail: [email protected]
123
1110
M. Ivanova, C. Paternotte
exactly it solves the problem of theory choice. However, these reconstructions are unsatisfying for a number of reasons. First, it is doubtful that they are faithful to Duhem’s concept. Indeed, some properties that Duhem attributed to good sense seem to be left out in these reconstructions, whereas some other properties they focus on are taken out of their original context. Moreover, these reconstructions disagree with respect to the central characteristics of good sense. Second, it is also doubtful whether these accounts provide adequate solutions to the problem of theory choice. For instance, none of them explain how an agent-based account can guarantee that good sense is reliable. Neither do they explain how an agent based approach could function in situation of underdetermination in order to lead to a conclusive choice. As a consequence, it is unclear whether good sense should, or even can, be a solution to the problem of
Data Loading...
