Phenomenological Distinctions Between Empathy De Vivo and Empathy in Fiction: From Contemporary Direct Perception Theory
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Phenomenological Distinctions Between Empathy De Vivo and Empathy in Fiction: From Contemporary Direct Perception Theory Back to Edith Stein’s Eidetics of Empathy Francesca De Vecchi1 · Francesca Forlè1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract This paper deals with phenomenological distinctions concerning empathy with real persons and empathy with fictional characters. We will introduce both contemporary accounts of our perception of others and Edith Stein’s account of empathy. These theories will turn out to be fruitful in defending our main thesis, i.e. that the differences between empathy with real people and empathy with fictional characters are not structural but just qualitative. We will argue that in both cases empathy is a direct act of perceiving others and their lived experience. However, stemming from Stein’s work, we will underline that empathy with real persons is in principio more vivid and intense than empathy with fictional characters. In order to identify similarities and differences between empathy de vivo and empathy in fiction, we will focus on the following issues: the quality of perception; the motivational context and the “life-world context”; the ontological status of persons vs. characters. Keywords Direct perception of others · Eidetics of empathy · Fiction · Degrees and quality of experience · Qualitative ontology · Motivational and life-world contexts
1 Introduction This paper deals with phenomenological distinctions between empathy with real persons on the one hand, and empathy with fictional characters on the other. In the first section of the paper, we will focus on contemporary phenomenologically oriented accounts of the perception of others (Gallagher 2008; Krueger 2012; Overgaard 2012), based on Scheler’s topic of «expressive unity» (Scheler 1913/1923) and, in the second section, on Edith Stein’s account of empathy (1917). We will point out that in all these accounts the act of perceiving others is a direct one, in which others’ lived experiences are given directly to us. Moreover, we will highlight that the contemporary accounts rightly underline the importance of face-to-face interactive contexts for most of our intersubjective encounters, but also recognize that there are cases, in reality as well as in fiction, * Francesca Forlè [email protected] Francesca De Vecchi [email protected] 1
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano, Italy
in which we understand others without face-to-face interaction and even without sharing their context. However, these contemporary theories do not provide us with an exhaustive account of the extent to which direct perception may still be valid in these non-face-to-face cases. We will point out that the latter are particularly interesting for distinguishing between the direct perception of others de vivo on the one hand, and in fiction, on the other hand. Indeed, when we are watching a movie or reading a novel, we have neither faceto-face interaction nor a shared spatiotemporal context with the characters; nonetheless, we w
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