Prejudices of Opinions
Francis Bacon is the originator of the demand to suspend judgment about a given theory first and then to commit oneself to it only to the degree to which extant evidence supports it, to the degree of belief in it that is rational given available empirical
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Prejudices of Opinions
7.1
Suspension of Judgment
Francis Bacon is the originator of the demand to suspend judgment about a given theory first and then to commit oneself to it only to the degree to which extant evidence supports it, to the degree of belief in it that is rational given available empirical information. This demand is very widespread and deserves special attention. Before showing that it goes back to Bacon and before explaining why he and his followers were and still are its ardent advocates despite all the criticism that diverse critics have leveled against it, let me discuss the view itself no matter who may have been its originator. The best argument in favor of this theory that I have found is in Russell’s charming Skeptical Essays of 1928. His presentation of his view is a part of his introduction: … The doctrine in question is this: it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever to suppose it true. … The scepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: (1) that when the experts are agreed the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; (2) that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert; and (3) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the ordinary man would do well to suspend judgment.
Russell’s skepticism is an argument in support of his demand for tolerance. He suggests that the more doubtful are the less unkind to those who do not share their views. I chose the following beautiful passage from his book (Ch. 14) as representative: Freedom of opinion … is the most important freedom, and the only one which requires no limitation whatever. … The fundamental argument for freedom of opinion is the doubtfulness of our beliefs. If we certainly knew the truth, there would be something to be said for teaching it. But in that case it could be taught without invoking authority, by means of its inherent reasonableness … From our human point of view, it is an ideal, towards which we can approximate, but which we cannot hope to reach.
J. Agassi, The Very Idea of Modern Science: Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 298, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5351-8_7, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
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Prejudices of Opinions
This passage represents the fundamental element of classical rationalism. Russell suggests that the basis for it is the idea of rational degree of belief (or rather of disbelief) based on extant evidence. His version of it is unusual. To begin with, he recognizes that we are all ignorant of the extant evidence and of its reliability. Also, he trusts experts on this: he assumes that their accord rests on evidence so that that both their agreements and their disagreements are reasonable. This of course is very problematic: it clearly does not hold in non-scientific societies, namely, for the majority of humanity even today. For the sake of freedom of opinion and of speech, let us now agree, it is good to know that
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