Preventing Blackhole Attack in DSR-Based Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Wireless ad hoc networks become more and more popular and significant in many fields. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these types of networks make them vulnerable to a large group of attac
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Abstract Wireless ad hoc networks become more and more popular and significant in many fields. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these types of networks make them vulnerable to a large group of attacks, such as blackhole attacks. In this paper, we proposed a scheme to prevent blackhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. Our scheme consists of three mechanisms which are trust management mechanism, detection mechanism and location mechanism. The performance simulation analysis confirms the availability and efficiency of our scheme.
Keywords Wireless ad hoc networks Blackhole attack Detection Location Trust
1 Introduction Wireless Ad hoc networks [1] are attracting great interest. Compared to other types of wireless networks, wireless ad hoc networks are more vulnerable to attacks due to their unique characteristics. This paper focuses on preventing blackhole attacks F. Shi D. Jin Department of Computer Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea e-mail: [email protected] D. Jin e-mail: [email protected] W. Liu (&) Department of Information and Industrial Engineering, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea e-mail: [email protected]
S.-S. Yeo et al. (eds.), Computer Science and its Applications, Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering 203, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5699-1_96, Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
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Fig. 1 Blackhole attack scenario
[2]. The malicious node sends fake Route Reply message (RREP) including fake routing path to the source node and claims a short route to the destination. Consequently, the source node is attracted to select the route path with the blackhole nodes. Afterwards, the malicious node can misuse the packets. As shown in Fig. 1, source S intends to perform transmission to destination D. According to Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol, node S broadcasts Route Request message (RREQ), the destination node or the intermediate node, which has the route path to destination, replies RREP to the source node piggybacking the route path. As receiving the RREQ, the malicious node M sends RREP immediately piggybacking a fake routing path (e.g., S-M-D) which is shorter than the normal path (e.g., S-A-B-D), so data traffic will be attracted through the malicious node M, i.e., all the packets sent by node S are drawn into the malicious node M. Then node M can misuse or simply drop those packets. In this paper, we assume that DSR protocol is used in the network. However, our scheme can be extended to other routing protocols, like Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV), DestinationSequenced Distance Vector (DSDV), etc. The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section summarizes and discusses the related works. In Sect. 3, we present the details of our scheme. First, we present a trust management mechanism to introduce trust value to each node. Through this trust management mechanism, the LMT node can be elected. Then we present a detection mechanism to d
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