An Implementation of Navigation Message Authentication with Reserved Bits for Civil BDS Anti-Spoofing
Since navigation message authentication (NMA) requires a modification in space segment and the signal broadcasted by satellites, negligent implementations of NMA may cause a failure in legacy GNSS receiver to process civil GNSS signal. This paper proposes
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Abstract Since navigation message authentication (NMA) requires a modification in space segment and the signal broadcasted by satellites, negligent implementations of NMA may cause a failure in legacy GNSS receiver to process civil GNSS signal. This paper proposes an implementation of NMA applying reserved bits as signature area. Digital signature and key chain algorithms are employed to improve security and efficiency of the implement. In additional, performance of this implementation is investigated.
Keywords Anti-spoofing Digital signature Reserved bits Navigation message authentication
1 Introduction GNSS spoofing attack refers to the attack performed by broadcasting a counterfeit GNSS signal to the target receiver. Without extra information, the receiver is not able to distinguish an authorized signal from its fake replica. NMA is an effective method to identify authorized signal by authenticating the signature attached to the navigation message. Since NMA may include a modification in the structure of GNSS signal, the implementation should be designed carefully to maintain the compatibility for legacy receivers. The spoofing attack neutralized by NMA can be detailed as the security code estimation and replay (SCER) attack [1]. Several methods of NMA based on ECDSA and TESLA were proposed recent years [1–7]. In latest research, performance of NMA was measured by two indicators as time to first authenticated fix (TTFAF) and time between authentications (TBA) in term of efficiency [8]. These
M. Yuan Z. Lv H. Chen J. Li G. Ou (&) School of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, Hunan, China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017 J. Sun et al. (eds.), China Satellite Navigation Conference (CSNC) 2017 Proceedings: Volume II, Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering 438, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4591-2_6
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works mainly concentrate on safety, feasibility and efficiency of NMA and ignore the affects to legacy receivers. Compatibility is a significant characteristic of GNSS. Modifications in navigation message should guarantee the capability for legacy receivers. This work provides an implementation of NMA for BDS. The implementation attaches the signature to the reserved bits in navigation message. Legacy receivers need no upgrade to maintain the capability and other receivers can achieve the anti-spoofing ability by a modification in software. The paper is organized as follows: model of SCER attack and basic principles of NMA are discussed in Sect. 2; the proposed strategy of NMA is demonstrated in Sect. 3; design of modified navigation message structure is introduced in Sect. 4; an analysis of performance is performed in Sect. 5.
2 Model of SCER Attack and Algorithms for NMA Meaconing attack can be mitigated because there is always a delay in the spoofing signal to the authorized signal. Receivers can examine the time mark of all validate signal and pick up the signal with the minimum delay. However, SCER signal can
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