Beyond Empathy: Compassion and the Reality of Others
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Beyond Empathy: Compassion and the Reality of Others Matthias Schloßberger1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract In the history of philosophy as well as in most recent discussions, empathy is held to be a key concept that enables a basic understanding of the other while at the same time acting as the foundation of our moral emotionality. In this paper I want to show why empathy is the wrong candidate for both of these tasks. If we understand empathy as projection, i.e. a process of imaginary self-transposition, we are bound to presuppose a fully established interpersonal sphere. If we consider empathy as synonymous with compassion it is highly questionable if we ever reach the other person in his or her otherness. Max Scheler and other early phenomenologists offer very fruitful approaches to both problems without resorting to empathy. I will present some of their thoughts and focus especially on Scheler’s claim about the connection between the experience of the real other and the intentionality of compassion. Keywords Empathy · Projection · Imagination · Compassion · Illusionary feelings · Early phenomenologists · Max Scheler · Moritz Geiger · Social cognition · Moral grounding · Interpersonal sphere
1 Introduction In current philosophical and psychological debates there is no consensus when it comes to the question what empathy is. Some use the term in a very broad sense for different but somehow related phenomena. They deliberately do not offer any clear definition. Proponents of this position are, for example, Coplan and Goldie. Instead of defining empathy, they emphasize two functions of empathy, namely an epistemic and an ethical one: “[Empathy] has been seen as centrally important in at least two respects. First it has been seen as important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people’s minds, and to predict and explain what they will think, feel and do. And secondly, it has been seen as important in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically.” (Coplan and Goldie 2011, p. IX). Others insist that there is a clear-cut singular phenomenon called empathy. However, they do not agree on which phenomenon exactly qualifies as empathy. Some of them understand empathy as a basic understanding of the other (problem of other minds). For them, empathy amounts to * Matthias Schloßberger [email protected]‑berlin.de 1
Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany
cognitive processes that result in an understanding of the mental states of other people—in other words: social cognition. However, there are others who understand empathy mainly as a kind of compassion or sympathy or even take it to be synonymous with compassion. They define empathy as the ability to understand and feel the other’s suffering and to act accordingly out of compassion (this is the basic premise of care ethics). In the following I will argue that there are several clearly distinguishable phenomena we must keep apart. I will do
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