Conceptual Flux Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concep
How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentati
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STUDIES IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS VOLUME24 EDITOR James H. Fetzer, University of Minnesota, Duluth ADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARD Fred Dretske, Stanford University Charles E. M. Dunlop, University of Michigan, Flint Ellery Eells, Univeristy ofWisconsin, Madison Alick Elithorn, Royal Free Hospital, London Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University Alvin Goldman, University of Arizona Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University Frank Keil, Cornell University William Rapaport, State University of New York at Buffalo Barry Richards, Imperial College, London Stephen Stich, Rutgers University Lucia Vaina, Boston University Terry Winograd, Stanford University
CONCEPTUAL FLUX Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change by
MARK PERLMAN Department of Philosophy, Western Oregon University, Monmouth, Oregon, U.S.A.
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-5415-9
ISBN 978-94-015-9462-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-9462-2
AII Rights Reserved © 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2000 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2000 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form Of by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
Series Preface This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and dataprocessing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (regarding the mental abilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will appear also appear from time to time. Tbe prospect of misrepresentation has proven a major stumbling block for theories of meaning, especially those known as "naturalistic theories". The ramifications of this circumstance are explored by Mark Perlman in a lucid and fascinating study that supports a radical form of "meaning holism", according to which changes in meaning are changes in concepts and conceptual changes, in turn, are controlled, not by considerations of truth and falsity, but by pragmatic considerations. As Heraclitus once maintained that you cannot step into the same river twice, Perlman now contends that you cannot use the same concept twice. Few of us are likely to agree with everything that Perlman has to say, but almost all ofus williearn something from his sustained development of controversial claims.
lH.F.
To my wife Beth, w
