Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason
- PDF / 689,991 Bytes
- 16 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 114 Downloads / 253 Views
Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason Matthias Michel1,2
· Megan A. K. Peters3
Received: 3 January 2020 / Accepted: 10 October 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. Keywords Confirmation bias · Myside bias · Cognition · Perception · Confidence Across a wide variety of experiments, subjects exhibit a confirmation bias, “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson 1998, p. 175). This bias is widespread, even among those who are (supposed to be) searching for objective truths such as judges, scientists, and physicians (Nickerson 1998). At a social level, confirmation bias could lead to the aggregation of like-minded individuals and group polarization, thus altering public debates (Sunstein 2002; Myers 1982). As ubiquitous as it is, that we have a confirmation bias is somewhat bewildering. To survive (and, all things considered, why not?), it is a good thing to acquire accurate beliefs and avoid holding inaccurate ones. But having a confirmation bias often leads
B
Matthias Michel [email protected]
1
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
2
Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
3
Department of Bioengineering, Interdepartmental Graduate Program in Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, University of California Riverside, Riverside, USA
123
Synthese
us to hold inaccurate beliefs, with potentially disastrous consequences down the road. So, here’s a puzzle: why do we have a confirmation bias? One of the most influential responses to this challenge has been put forward by proponents of the so-called “argumentative theory of reasoning” (Mercier and Sperber 2011, 2017; Mercier 2016; for other accounts, see e.g., Evans 1989; Kunda 1990; Stanovich 2004). In this article, our aim is to critically evaluate a central prediction of this theory. The argumentative theory of reasoning makes two central claims (Mercier and Sperber 2011; Mercier 2016). The first is about the nature of reasoning. As Mercier (2016) notes: The vast bulk of cognition performs perceptual, motoric, and inferential functions without any attention being paid to reasons. By contrast, reaso
Data Loading...
