Do metaphorical sharks bite? Simulation and abstraction in metaphor processing
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Do metaphorical sharks bite? Simulation and abstraction in metaphor processing Hamad Al-Azary 1 & Albert N. Katz 2 Accepted: 3 October 2020 # The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2020
Abstract In a metaphor such as lawyers are sharks, the concept lawyers, which is the metaphor topic, and the concept sharks, which is the metaphor vehicle, interact to produce a figurative meaning such that lawyers are predatory. Some theorists argue that sensorimotor properties of the vehicle are the basis of metaphor comprehension. Accordingly, the metaphor lawyers are sharks is processed as a simulation in which bodily actions related to sharks are accessed (e.g., sharks chasing prey). In contrast, the longstanding assumption is that metaphors are processed as abstractions with no role played by sensorimotor properties. From this theoretical perspective, abstract characteristics of sharks (e.g., vicious, predatory) are argued to be the core properties involved in metaphor processing. Here, we juxtapose these two opposing views of metaphor processing using cross-modal lexical priming. We find evidence that low-familiar metaphors (e.g., highways are snakes) prime bodily-action associates (i.e., slither) but not abstraction associates (i.e., danger), and are hence processed via simulation, whereas high-familiar metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks) prime abstraction associates (i.e., killer) but not bodily-action associates (i.e., bite) and are therefore processed via abstraction. The results align with views of cognition and language that posit the presence of both embodied and abstract representations. Keywords Psycholinguistics . Semantic priming . Speech perception . Metaphor
Introduction In nominal metaphors such as lawyers are sharks, two unrelated concepts are juxtaposed resulting in a literally false assertion. Yet, with relative ease, people rapidly and automatically process the implied figurative meaning of metaphors (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin, 1982; McElree & Nordlie, 1999). There is wide-spread agreement among theorists that processing metaphoric meaning involves assigning relevant semantic properties of the vehicle (i.e., shark) to the topic (i.e., lawyer). However, there remains controversy concerning the nature of the semantic representations that are accessed during metaphor processing. According to the abstraction view, processing metaphors such as lawyers are sharks involves constructing a general
* Hamad Al-Azary [email protected] 1
Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Communication, Lawrence Technological University, Southfield, MI, USA
2
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada
abstraction of the concept shark and, from this abstraction, accessing figurative properties such as vicious or predatory, rather than literal properties such as swims or bites (e.g., Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Glucksberg, 2008). Conversely, in the simulation view, processing lawyers are sharks involves a simulation of bodily actions related to literal sharks, such as in a sce
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